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I. INTRODUCTION
At common law, warrantless arrests for misdemeanors' could be made
only for offenses that involved a breach of the peace2 and that were commit-
ted in the presence of the person making the arrest In addition, the arrest
1. Throughout this article the term misdemeanor will be used to encompass all
offenses of less than felony grade including violations, infractions, and the like.
New Jersey abolished the felony/misdemeanor distinction effective September 1,
1979, and now divides crimes into four degrees. New Jersey continues, however, to
recognize misdemeanors and high misdemeanors. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-1
(West 1987).
Maine abolished the felony/misdemeanor distinction by statute in 1976 but
nonetheless has different rules governing arrests for different categories of offenses.
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 15 (West Supp. 1992); see also State v.
Carey, 412 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Me. 1980) (observing that title 17A, § 15(1)(A) permits
warrantless arrests for certain minor offenses "not normally committed in the officer's
presence but where the legislature for practical or policy reasons" gave police officers
felony-type arrest powers. These include drug offenses where "evidence may be
destroyed or otherwise lost if an immediate" arrest is not made or for other offenses
"where the officer reasonably believes the suspect" will injure others or will "otherwise
not be apprehended").
2. The common law arrest authority extended to breaches of the peace immediate-
ly threatened. See, e.g., Pavish v. Meyers, 225 P. 633, 634 (Wash. 1924) ("[A] peace
officer may, without a warrant therefor, arrest one who, in his presence, breaches the
peace or threatens so to do."); Hughes v. State, 238 S.W. 588, 596 (Tenn. 1922)
("[A]n officer may lawfully arrest a person if a breach of the peace is threatened in his
presence ... [and] it is not necessary for the officer to see and know that the law is
being violated."); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925) ("[A]
peace officer[,] like a private person,] has at common law no power of arresting
without a warrant except when a breach of the peace has been committed in his
presence or there is reasonable ground for supposing that a breach of the peace is
about to be committed or renewed in his presence.") (quoting HALSBURY's LAws OF
ENGLAND vol. 9, part III, at 612.).
It has been said that "[t]he reason for arrest for misdemeanors without warrant
at common law was promptly to suppress breaches of the peace." Carroll, 267 U.S.
at 157; People v. Phillips, 30 N.E.2d 488, 489 (N.Y. 1940) (same); People ex rel.
Robison v. Haug, 37 N.W. 21, 25 (Mich. 1888) (this exception "has only been allowed
by reason of the immediate danger to the safety of the community against crimes of
violence .... Assaults and riotous conduct make up the largest part of the list.").
3. Commonwealth v. Mekalian, 194 N.E.2d 390, 391-92 (Mass. 1963) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Gorman, 192 N.E. 618, 619 (Mass. 1934)) (holding arrest improper
because it "was without a warrant and there was no breach of the peace"); Phillips, 30
N.E.2d at 489 ("The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons guilty or
suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of the peace .... )
(quoting STEPHEN's HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, p. 193); see also
[Vol. 58
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had to be made at the time of the offense or as soon thereafter as possible.'
Over the last century, the common law rule has suffered considerable erosion'
as most American jurisdictions have expanded the power of police officers to
make warrantless misdemeanor arrests.'
Boucher v. Town of Southbridge, 679 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D. Mass. 1988) (stating that
this was "the common law rule concerning warrantless arrests for misdemeanors").
4. See, e.g., Mekalian, 194 N.E.2d at 391-92 (quoting Gorman, 192 N.E. at 619)
(the offense and the arrest must form one continuous act); Oleson v. Pincock, 251 P.
23, 26 (Utah 1926) ("At common law the officer could only make an arrest for a
misdemeanor... if he did so at the time the offense was committed."); State v. Lewis,
33 N.E. 405, 407 (Ohio 1893) (where a peace officer "acts upon view [to arrest for a
misdemeanor], he is required to act promptly"); Hawkins v. Lutton, 70 N.W. 483, 485
(Wis. 1897) ("[A]rrest must be made at the time of the offense, or immediately after
its commission."); see also Boucher 679 F. Supp. at 133 (same); Commonwealth v.
Conway, 316 N.E.2d 757, 759 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974) (citing authorities); EDWARD C.
FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST § 87, at 190-91 (1987); Horace A. Wilgus, Arrest Without
A Warrant (pt. 2), 22 MICH. L. REv. 673, 701 (1924) ("immediate and continuous
pursuit.").
5. See Peter G. Hastings, Note, Arrest Without A Warrant in New England, 40
B.U. L. REV. 58, 60 (1960) (observing that statutes in the New England states "have
tended to lower the common law standards required to arrest for" misdemeanors); see
also authorities ciied infra note 8.
6. At common law, arrest powers did not vary "according to whether the person
responsible for the arrest was a citizen or a police officer, because the inception of the
common law of arrest antedated the creation of professional police forces." B. JAMES
GEORGE, CONSTITUTONAL LmITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRuMIAL CASES 28 (Supp.
1973). Arrests by private persons continue to be governed by the common law rule
in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Hart, 539 A.2d 551, 554 (Vt. 1987) ("Private
citizens may not arrest for misdemeanors committed in their presence unless the
misdemeanor constitutes a breach of the peace."); Radloff v. National Food Stores,
Inc., 123 N.W.2d 570, 571 (Wis. 1963) (private persons may arrest for a misdemeanor
committed in their presence only "where the public security requires it" to protect
against acts which involve or threaten violence); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (1972 and
Supp. 1993) ("a private person may arrest... without warrant, for.., a breach of the
peace threatened or committed in his presence.")
Many jurisdictions have expanded the common law powers of private citizens to
make arrests. Even in these jurisdictions, however, private persons generally have far
more limited powers to arrest than do peace officers. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/107-3 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("Any person may arrest another when he has
reasonable grounds to believe that an offense other than an ordinance violation is being
committed."); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.005(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992)
("A private person may make an arrest when a felony has been committed in fact and
he has probable cause to believe that the person being arrested has committed it."); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 214 (West 1991) ("A private person may make an arrest
when the person arrested has committed a felony, whether in or out of his presence.");
1993]
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Most American jurisdictions have eliminated the breach of the peace7
requirement and now allow police officers to make warrantless arrests for all
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-404 (1988) ("No private person may arrest another person
except as provided in G.S. 15A-405 [relating to assisting law enforcement offi-
cers].... A private person may detain another person when he has probable cause to
believe that the person detained has committed in his presence: (1) A felony, (2) A
breach of the peace, (3) A crime involving physical injury to another person, or (4) A
crime involving theft or destruction of property."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.04
(Anderson 1992) ("When a felony has been committed, or there is reasonable ground
to believe that a felony has been committed, any person without a warrant may arrest
another whom he has reasonable cause to believe is guilty of the offense, and detain
him until a warrant can be obtained."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-10 (Law. Co-op.
1985) (any person may arrest "[u]pon (a) view of a felony committed, (b) ... (c)
view of a larceny committed"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-3 (1988) ("(1) For
a public offense . . ., committed or attempted in his presence; or (2) For a felony
which has been in fact committed...."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-3 (1990) ("A
private person may arrest another: (1) For a public offense committed or attempted in
his presence; or (2) When a felony has been committed and he has reasonable cause
to believe the person arrested has committed it."); see also ALA. CODE § 15-10-7
(1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3884 (1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-582 (1989);
IDAHO CODE § 19-604 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-1-4 (Bums 1985); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 764.16 (West Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-502
(1991); NEV. REv. STAT. § 171.126 (1991); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 140.35-.40
(Consol. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-20 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 202 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.225 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-3-3 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-109 (1990); Wyo. STAT. § 7-8-101
(1977).
7. Precisely what constitutes a breach of the peace has not always been clear. See
CHARLEs E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMAL PROCEDURE § 61 (13th ed. 1989) (citing
cases). Courts in some jurisdictions have said that every violation of a criminal law
is a breach of the peace. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thompson v. Reichman, 188 S.W.
225, on reh'g 188 S.W. 597, 602 (Tenn. 1916).
[Vol. 58
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misdemeanors committed in the arresting officer's presence." Most jurisdic-
tions, however, retain the in-the-presence rule in some form.'
A few jurisdictions have statutes that appear to authorize warrantless
misdemeanor arrests only if the offense for which the arrest is made was
committed in the arresting officer's presence.'0 Many jurisdictions have a
8. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 181; J. Terry Roach, Comment, The Presence
Requirement and the "Police-Team" Rule in Arrest for Misdemeanors, 26 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 119, 119 (1969).
In 1924, Professor Wilgus observed that "[i]t is impossible to... enumerate the
great number of... misdemeanors or breaches of ordinances for which peace officers
may arrest, without a warrant, if committed in their presence." Wilgus, supra note 4,
at 706.
In 1927, it was "said that seven states grant to peace officers, though not to
private persons, a privilege to arrest without a warrant for any misdemeanor committed
in their presence." Francis H. Bohlen and Harry Shulman, Arrest With and Without
a Warrant, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 486 (1927). By 1967, it could be said that "most
modem statutes have enlarged the powers of arrest without warrant to extend to any
offense committed in the presence of the arresting officer." FISHER, supra note 4, at
181.
9. Whether an offense took place "in-the-presence" of the arresting officer is a
frequent subject of litigation. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(c),
at 405-411 (2d ed. 1987) (hereinafter SEARCH AND SEIZURE), for an extensive
discussion and citation of cases. Generally, a misdemeanor is said to have occurred
in a police officer's presence if the officer "is made aware of its commission by one
or more of his physical senses." Roach, supra note 8, at 120 n.8. The "in-the-
presence" requirement is sometimes interpreted as meaning that the officer must be
certain as to the identity of the offender. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE
DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 242-43 (1965) [hereinafter ARREST].
Many jurisdictions have long held that the "in-the-presence" requirement is
satisfied if the arresting officer learns of the offense from other officers in whose
presence it was committed. See, e.g., People v. Dixon, 222 N.W.2d 749, 751-52
(Mich. 1974); Main v. McCarty, 15 Il. 442, 443 (1854); see also Roach, supra note
8 (discussing Maryland law). But see Penn v. Commonwealth, 412 S.E.2d 189, 191
(Va. Ct. App. 1991) (citing cases holding to the contrary but rejecting "the 'police-
team qualification for warrantless misdemeanor arrests"').
10. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 62-10-9 (Supp. 1993) ("Sheriffs and [their deputies
may]... make arrests for any crime for which a warrant has been issued... and...
without a warrant for all violations of any of the criminal laws of the United States,
or of this state, when committed in their presence."); see also W. VA. CODE § 15-5-18
(1991) (permitting peace officers to "arrest without a warrant any person violating or
attempting to violate in such officer's presence any order, rule or regulation made
pursuant to this article."); id. § 62-10-6 (Supp. 1993) (constables); id. § 62-10-8
(special police officers); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33 §§ 4194, 4493 (1983); id. tit. 34,
App. II R. 7, 11 (1991); cf ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 15 (West 1983 & Supp.
1993) (permitting a law enforcement officer to arrest without a warrant "any person
1993]
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general in-the-presence rule" and, in addition, authorize warrantless arrests
for misdemeanors not committed in the arresting officer's presence if specified
circumstances exist 2 or if the arrest is for specified misdemeanors. 3
who has committed in his presence or is committing in his presence any Class D or
Class E crime."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:5-25 (West 1990) (constable, sheriff's officer,
police officer, and peace officer may "arrest any person violating in his presence any
provision of chapter 3 of this title."); id § 40A:14-152 (West 1993) (municipal police
officers); id. § 53:2-1 (West 1986) (state police).
11. In most jurisdictions where there appears to be a requirement that a
misdemeanor, in fact, be committed in the arresting officer's presence, the courts have
held that it is sufficient if the officer reasonably believes that the person to be arrested
is committing a misdemeanor. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 194-95 (citing cases).
12. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-1f (1993) ("(a) Peace officers ... shall
arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person for any offense in their
jurisdiction, when the person is taken or apprehended in the act or on the speedy
information of others... ; (b) [certain peace officers] shall arrest, without previous
complaint and warrant, any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe
has committed or is committing a felony."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20 (Harrison
Supp. 1993) (warrantless arrests may be made by an officer if "the offense is
committed in his presence or within his immediate knowledge; if the offender-is
endeavoring to escape; if the officer has probable cause to believe that an act of family
violence ... has been committed; or for other cause there is likely to be failure of
justice for want of ajudicial officer to issue a warrant."); IOWA CODE § 804.7 (1993)
.("1. For a public offense committed or attempted in the peace officer's presence. 2.
Where a public offense has in fact been committed, and the peace officer has
reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it."); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-13-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985) ("The sheriffs and deputy sheriffs of this
State may arrest without warrant any person and all persons who, within their view,
violate any of the criminal laws of this State if such arrest be made at the time of such
violation of law or immediately thereafter."); id. § 23-5-40; id. § 23-10-60 (deputy
sheriffs may arrest without a warrant "upon view or upon prompt information or
complaint"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-2 (1990) ("A peace officer ... may, without
a warrant, arrest a person: (1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the
presence of any peace officer ... (3) When he has reasonable cause to believe the
person has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the
person may: (a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; (b) destroy or conceal
evidence of the commission of the offense; or (c) injure another person or damage
property belonging to another person."); Wyo. STAT. § 7-2-102 (Supp. 1993) ("(b) A
peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant when: (i) Any criminal offense
is being committed in the officer's presence by the person to be arrested; (ii) [felony
offenses]; (iii) The officer has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been
committed, that the person to be arrested has committed it and that the person, unless
immediately arrested: (A) Will not be apprehended; (B) May cause injury to himself
or others or damage to property; or (C) May destroy or conceal evidence of the
commission of the misdemeanor.").
[Vol. 58
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13. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (Supp. 1993) ("(a) An officer may arrest any
person without a warrant, on any day and at any time for: (1) Any public offense
committed or breach of the peace threatened in his presence; (2) When a felony has
been committed ... (7) When he has reasonable cause to believe that a felony or
misdemeanor has been committed by the person arrested in violation of a protection
order... (8) Whenever an offense involves family violence .... "); ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.25.030 (Supp. 1993) ("(a) A private person or a peace officer without a warrant
may arrest a person (1) for a crime committed or attempted in the presence of the
person making the arrest; (2) when the person has committed a felony . . . "; (b)(2)
[for certain offenses involving children and] "when the victim is a spouse or former
spouse of the person who committed the crime; a parent, grandparent, child, or
grandchild of the person who committed the crime .... "); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-
106 (Michie Supp. 1993) ("(b) A certified law enforcement officer may make an
arrest: ... (2)(A) Without a warrant, where a public offense is committed in his
presence, or where he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has
committed a felony. (B) ... a certified law enforcement officer may arrest a person
for a misdemeanor without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that
the person has committed battery upon another person and the officer finds evidence
of bodily harm, and the officer reasonably believes that there is danger of violence
unless the person alleged to have committed the battery is arrested without delay.");
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15 (West Supp. 1993) (a law enforcement officer may arrest
a person without a warrant when: "(1) The person has committed a felony or
misdemeanor or violated a municipal or county ordinance in the presence of the officer
... (6) There is probable cause to believe that the person has [violated a protective
order] ... (7)(a) ... committed an act of domestic violence"); IDAHO CODE § 19-603
(Supp. 1993) ("A peace officer ... may, without a warrant, arrest a person: 1. For
a public offense committed or attempted in his presence .... 6. When at the scene of
a domestic disturbance there is reasonable cause to believe .. that the person arrested
has committed an assault or battery. 7. When there is reasonable cause to believe...
that the person arrested has committed [a crime aboard an aircraft].... ."); IOWA CODE
§ 804.7 (1993) ("1. For a public offense committed or attempted in the peace officer's
presence .... 5. If the peace officer has reasonable grounds for believing that domestic
abuse.., has occurred and has reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be
arrested has committed it."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.005 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1992) ("(1) A peace officer may make an arrest: ... (d) Without a warrant
when a misdemeanor... has been committed in his presence; or (e) Without a warrant
[for certain other crimes not committed in his presence] ... (2) (a) ... without a
warrant [where there is] danger or threat of danger [to a family member]"); MICH.
COmP. LAWS ANN. § 764.15 (West Supp. 1993) ("(1) A peace officer, without a
warrant, may arrest a person in the following situations: (a) When a felony,
misdemeanor, or ordinance violation is committed in the peace officer's presence...
(j) When the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person was ...
[driving while intoxicated] (k) When the police officer has reasonable cause to believe
that... [certain other violations have occurred]."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.34 (West
Supp. 1993) ("(c) A peace officer ... [may] make an arrest without a warrant ...
under the following circumstances: (1) When a public offense has been committed or
19931
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attempted in the officer's.., presence; ... (5) Under the circumstances [under which
felony arrests are permitted], when the offense is a gross misdemeanor .... "); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 171.124 (1991) ("[A] peace officer ... may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: (a) For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence; (b) [For
a gross misdemeanor on the same terms as for felonies]"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2935.03 (Anderson 1993) (police shall "arrest and detain, until a warrant can be
obtained, a person found violating ... a law of this state, [or] an ordinance of a
municipal corporation" and persons whom "there is reasonable ground to believe [have
committed] ... an offense of violence, the offense of criminal child enticement...
the offense of public indecency ... the offense of domestic violence ... a theft
offense ... or a felony drug abuse offense ... ."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 196
(West 1992) ("A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person: 1. For a public
offense, committed or attempted in his presence; ... 5. When he has probable cause
to believe that the party was driving... a motor vehicle involved in an accident...
and was under the influence... ; 6. Anywhere, including his place of residence, if the
peace officer has probable cause to believe the person within the preceding four (4)
hours has committed an act of domestic abuse ... ."); PA. R. CRIM. P. 101 (1989)
(criminal proceedings may be initiated by arrest without a warrant when the offence
is a misdemeanor committed in the presence of the police officer making the arrest;
or... when the offense is a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the police
officer making the arrest, when such arrest without a warrant is specifically authorized
by statute."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-2 (1988) ("A law enforcement
officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (1) For a public offense, other than
a petty offense, committed or attempted in his presence; or (2) Upon probable cause
that a felony or Class 1 misdemeanor has been committed and the person arrested
committed it, although not in the officer's presence."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103
(Supp. 1993) ("An officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person (1) For a public
offense committed or a breach of the peace threatened in his presence ... " or for
certain traffic offenses and acts of domestic violence); TEx. CRiM. PROC. CODE ANN.
art. 14.01 (West 1977) ("(b) A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant
for any offense committed in his presence or within his view."); TEx. CRIM. PROC.
CODE ANN. art. 14.03 (West Supp. 1993) ("(a) Any peace officer may arrest, without
warrant: (1) persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which
reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony or breach of the
peace, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against the laws; (2) persons
who the peace officer has probable cause to believe have committed [various
offenses]"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81 (Michie 1990) (officers "may arrest, without
a warrant, any person who commits any crime in the presence of such officer" and
may also arrest without a warrant for certain traffic violations); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.31.100 (West 1990) ("A police officer may arrest a person without a
warrant for committing a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor only when the offense
is committed in the presence of the officer, except as provided in subsections (1)
through (8) of this section" relating to certain crimes including domestic abuse,
violations of various traffic laws, and other certain other offenses); see also ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-81-113 (Michie Supp. 1991) (provides for warrantless arrests for
domestic abuse); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West Supp. 1993) (allowing
[Vol. 58
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Many jurisdictions authorize warrantless misdemeanor arrests if there is
probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor was committed in the arresting
officer's presence. 4 Most of these jurisdictions also permit warrantless
arrests on probable cause for misdemeanors not committed in the officer's
presence if there is probable cause to believe that specified circumstances
exist 5 and/or if the arrest is for a specified misdemeanor. 6
warrantless arrests for domestic violence); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3929(d) (1983)
(retail theft); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-3-2.1 (Supp. 1993) (defining
circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is permitted for certain violations of
protective orders ar acts of domestic violence); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.1 (Michie
1990) (allowing correctional officers to arrest without a warrant for certain offenses);
id. § 19.2-81.3 (Supp. 1993) (allowing warrantless arrests for assaults against family
or household members); WyO. STAT. § 7-20-102 (Supp. 1993) (permits warrantless
arrests where a peace officer "has probable cause to believe that" domestic violence
has occurred).
14. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) ("(a) A peace
officer... without a warrant, may arrest a person whenever... (1) The officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public
offense in the officer's presence. (2) The person arrested has committed a felony
.... "); id. § 836.5 (West 1985) ("A public officer may arrest without a warrant
whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a misdemeanor in his presence . . . ."); see also Cherry v. Williams, 316
P.2d 880, 881 (N.M. 1957) (warrantless misdemeanor arrest is lawful if the
defendant's conduct "appeared reasonably ... to amount to a disturbance of the peace,
or to be otherwise unlawful in its nature [and it] ... was in the presence of the"
arresting officer); infra notes 15 and 16 (citing statutes).
15. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2401 (1988) ("(c) The officer has probable
cause to believe that the person is committing or has committed: (1) A felony; or (2)
a misdemeanor, and the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that:
(A) The person will not be apprehended or evidence of the crime will be irretrievably
lost... (3) the person may cause injury to self or others or damage to property...
(d) Any crime, except a traffic infraction, has been or is being committed by the
person in the officer's view."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311 (1991) ("probable
cause to believe that the person is committing an offense or that the person has
committed an offense and existing circumstances require immediate arrest. (2) ...
Arrest is the preferred response in domestic abuse cases involving injury to the victim,
use or threatened use of a weapon, violation of a restraining order, or other imminent
danger to the victim."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02 (1989) ("a peace officer may
arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that
such person has committed: (1) A felony; (2) A misdemeanor and the officer has
reasonable cause to believe that such person either (a) will not be apprehended unless
immediately arrested, (b) may cause injury to himself or herself or others or damage
to property unless immediately arrested, (c) may destroy or conceal evidence of the
commission of such misdemeanor, or (d) has committed a misdemeanor in the
presence of the officer.. ."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:10 (1986 & Supp. 1992)
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(An officer may arrest without a warrant "whenever (a) He has probable cause to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a misdemeanor or violation in his
presence; or ... (c) He has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a misdemeanor or violation, and, if not immediately arrested, such person
will not be apprehended, will destroy or conceal evidence of the offense, or will cause
further personal injury or damage to property."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401 (Supp.
1992) ("(b)(1) ... An officer may arrest without a warrant any person who the officer
has probable cause to believe has committed a criminal offense in the officer's
presence. (2)... An officer may arrest without a warrant any person who the officer
has probable cause to believe: a. Has committed a felony; or b. Has committed a
misdemeanor, and: 1. Will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested, or 2. May
cause physical injury to himself or others, or damage to property unless immediately
arrested .... "); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-3 (1981) ("reasonable cause to believe that
such person is committing or has committed a misdemeanor or a petty misdemeanor,
and the officer has reasonable ground to believe that such person cannot be arrested
later or may cause injury to himself or others or loss or damage to property unless
immediately arrested."); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3(a) (Supp. 1992) ("A law enforcement
officer may arrest without a warrant a person whom the officer has probable cause to
believe has committed a crime in the presence of the officer ... (3) when the officer
has probable cause to believe that a person has committed a misdemeanor and the
person has refused to identify himself or herself... (4) when the officer has probable
cause to believe a person has committed a misdemeanor and, if not immediately
arrested, will cause personal injury or damage to property.").
16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1904 (1987) ("(a) An arrest by a peace
officer without a warrant for a misdemeanor is lawful whenever he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a misdemeanor: (1) In
his presence; (2) Out of his presence and without the State ... ; (3) Out of his
presence and within the State for the crime of shoplifting... ;(4) Out of his presence
and within the State for any misdemeanor involving physical injury or the threat
thereof or any misdemeanor involving illegal sexual contact or attempted sexual
conduct."); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581 (1989 & Supp. 1993) ("(a)(1) A law
enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant having previously been issued
therefor-... (B) a person who he has probable cause to believe has committed or
is committing an offense in his presence; (C) a person who he has probable cause to
believe has committed or is about to commit any offense listed in paragraph (2) and,
unless immediately arrested, may .... "); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-1-1(a) (Bums
Supp. 1993) ("A law enforcement officer may arrest a person when the officer has:
... (4) Probable cause to believe the person is committing or attempting to commit
a misdemeanor in the officer's presence; (5) Probable cause to believe that the person
has committed a battery resulting in bodily injury under IC 35-42-2-1 ... ; (6)
Probable cause to believe that the person violated IC 35-46-1-15.1 "); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-2401 (1988) ("probable cause to believe that the person is committing or has
committed: ... (2) a misdemeanor ... and probable cause to belive that (C) the
person has intentionally inflicted bodily harm to another person."); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 594B (Supp. 1993) ("(a) A police officer may arrest without a warrant any
[Vol. 58
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A few jurisdictions have completely eliminated the in-the-presence
requirement. 7 These jurisdictions allow warrantless arrests for both felonies
person who commits, or attempts'to commit, any felony or misdemeanor in the
presence of, or within the view of,-such officer. (b). .. any person whom the officer
may reasonably believe to have committed ... [a felony or misdemeanor in the
officer's presence or within the officer's view] .... (d) ... if: (1) The officer has
probable cause to believe that: (i) The person battered the person's spouse... (e)(1)
That an offense listed in subsection (f) of this section has been committed .. .);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02 (1989) (reasonable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested "has committed... (3) One or more of the following acts to one or more
household members ... ."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:10 (1986 & Supp. 1992) ("I.
An arrest by a peace officer without a warrant on a charge of a misdemeanor or a
violation is lawful whenever: (a) He has probable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a misdemeanor or violation in his presence; or (b) He has
probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has within the past 6 hours
committed abuse.., or has within the past 6 hours violated a temporary or permanent
protective order.. . ."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(b)(2) (Supp. 1992) ("An officer
may arrest without a warrant any person who the officer has probable cause to believe
... c. Has committed a misdemeanor under G.S.#14-72.1."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-
06-15 (1991) ("1. A law enforcement officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person:
a. For a public offense, committed or attempted in the officer's presence.., when...
the officer's senses reasonably indicates to the officer that a crime was in fact
committed or attempted in the officer's presence.... e. For ... [certain] public
offenses, not classified as felonies and not committed in the officer's presence ....
f. On a charge ... of driving ... a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic
beverages. g. For the offense of violating a protection order ... or for an assault
involving domestic violence . . . ."); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(1) (1991) ("(1) A
peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause
to believe that the person has committed... : (a) A felony, (b) A Class A misdemean-
or... (d) Reckless driving... (e) Driving while under the influence... (g) Criminal
driving .... (i) Any other offense in the officer's presence except traffic infractions
... and violations."); VT. R. CRiM. P. 3(a) (Supp. 1993) ("A law enforcement officer
may arrest without warrant a person whom the officer has probable cause to believe
has committed a crime in the presence of the officer .... (2) when the officer has
probable cause to believe a person has [violated a protective order or assaulted a
family or household member] .... "); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-402 (1989)
(allowing warrantless arrest by any person "if a petit larceny or a felony has been
committed .... "); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-7 (Michie 1984) (allowing warrantless
arrest at scene of domestic disturbance by officer who has probable cause to believe
an act of domestic violence has occurred); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-13 (1990) ("theft
of goods held or displayed for sale").
17. Elimination of the in-the-presence requirement has been urged by many
commentators. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 4, at 182-83; Roach, supra note 8, at 127
(arguing that the in-the-presence requirement "should be eliminated.").
1993]
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and misdemeanors if there is probable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a crime. 8
Only a few American jurisdictions still substantially follow the common
law rule limiting warrantless misdemeanor arrests to breaches of the peace
committed in the arresting officer's presence, and even these permit some
minor exceptions. 9 Most states, however, have not relaxed the common law
18. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-102 (1990) ("(1) A peace officer may
arrest a person when: (a) He has a warrant commanding that such person be arrested;
or (b) Any crime has been or is being committed by such person in his presence; or
(c) He has probable cause to believe that an offense was committed and has probable
cause to believe that the offense was committed by the person to be arrested."); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 803-3 (1985) ("Anyone in the act of committing a crime, may be
arrested by any person present, without a warrant."); Id. § 803-5(a) ("probable cause
to believe that such person has committed any offense, whether in the officer's
presence or otherwise."); 725 ILL, COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107-2 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("(1)
A peace officer may arrest a person when: (a) He has a wan-ant... ; or... (c) He
has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed an
offense."); LA. CODE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 213 (West Supp. 1993) ("A peace officer
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when:... (3) The peace officer has reasonable
cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense, although not
in the presence of the officer. .. ."); Mo. REV. STAT. § 43.195 (1986) ("Any member
of the Missouri state highway patrol may arrest on view, and without a warrant, any
person he sees violating or who he has reasonable grounds to believe has violated any
law of this state relating to the operation of motor vehicles."); id. § 544.216 (an
officer "may arrest on view, and without a warrant, any person he sees violating or
who he has reasonable grounds to believe has violated any law of this state, including
a misdemeanor."); N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 140.10 (Consol. 1986) ("a police officer
may arrest a person for: (a) Any offense when he has reasonable cause to believe that
such person has committed such offense in his presence; and (b) A crime when he has
reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such crime, whether in his
presence or otherwise."); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 968.07 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992) ("(1)
A law enforcement officer may arrest a person when: (a) He has a warrant ... (d)
There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has
committed a crime."); see also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(4) (Supp. 1993)
(permitting warrantless arrests on probable cause for a felony, a misdemeanor
committed in the officer's presence, and if "[a] misdemeanor or a petty offense has
been committed and [there is] probable cause to believe the person to be arrested has
committed the offense," but providing for issuance of a notice to appear where a
misdemeanor arrest was not based on acts committed in the presence of the arresting
officer).
Even in those states, occasional decisions refer to the common law rule as if it
were the law. See, e.g., People v. Lagle, 558 N.W.2d 514, 517 (111. 1990).
19. See, e.g., MASS. GmN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 21 (West 1993) (permitting
warrantless arrests for driving while intoxicated); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (Supp.
1993) ("(1) An officer or private person may arrest any person without warrant, for
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requirement that warrantless misdemeanor arrests must be made as soon as
possible."
Recently, the trend away from the common law rule has accelerated.
Many states, in an effort to encourage arrests in domestic abuse cases, now
allow officers to arrest without a warrant if they have probable cause to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a misdemeanor that is an
an indictable offense committed, or a breach of the peace threatened or attempted in
his presence; or when a person has committed a felony.... (3) Any law enforcement
officer may arrest a person without a warrant when he has probable cause to believe
that the person has, within twenty-four (24) hours of such arrest, knowingly committed
a misdemeanor which is an act of domestic violence or knowingly violated provisions
of a protective order .... "); Commonwealth v. Mekalian, 194 N.E.2d 390, 391-92
(Mass. 1963) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gorman, 192 N.E. 618, 619 (Mass. 1934))
(holding arrest improper because it "was without a warrant and there was no breach
of the peace."); see also Hastings, supra note 5, at 71, 83, 86 (stating that the common
law rule was the law in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont); cf TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-7-103 (1990) ("(a) An officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (1)
For a public offense committed or a breach of the peace threatened in his presence...
(6) At the scene of a traffic accident... (7) ... [in response to a domestic violence
call]"); State v. Hurtado, 529 A.2d 1000, 1006-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)
(Skillman J., dissenting), rev'd on dissent, 549 A.2d 428 (N.J. 1988) (holding that
statute limited warrantless arrests for ordinance violations to cases involving disorderly
conduct or a "breach of the peace.").
In 1927 one authority observed that until 1925 "the statements both of judicial
decisions and textbooks were substantially unanimous to the effect that there was no
privilege to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor other than a breach of the
peace, except in the case of a few misdemeanors such as 'night walking' and 'riding
armed' for which authority to arrest without a warrant had been given by statutes so
ancient that the statutory origin of the privilege had been forgotten and the privilege
regarded as substantially one at common law." Bohlen and Shulman, supra note 8, at
485-86.
20. FISHER, supra note 4, at 188. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15 (West
Supp. 1993) ("An arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor or the violation of a
municipal ordinance shall be made immediately or in fresh pursuit."); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-13-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (a sheriff who makes a warrantless arrest of a person
who has violated a criminal law must do so "at the time of such violation of law or
immediately thereafter."); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3(a) (Supp. 1993) (An officer who arrests
without a warrant for a crime committed in his presence shall do so "while the crime
is being committed or without unreasonable delay thereafter."); see also Common-
wealth v. Conway, 316 N.E.2d 757, 759 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974); Oleson v. Pincock,
251 P. 23, 26 (Utah 1926) (noting that "[u]nder some statutes.., the rule is less strict
[and] ... the arrest must be made at the time the offense is committed, or within a
reasonable time thereafter, or upon fresh and immediate pursuit of the offender.")
(quoting 5 C.J.S. 406, § 31); cf ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 15.2 (1983).
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act of domestic violence.2' Similar laws allow warrantless arrests when there
is probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested violated a protective
order.'
The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether any aspects
of the common law ban on warrantless misdemeanor arrests are required by
21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (Supp. 1993) ("(a) An officer may arrest any
person without a warrant, on any day and at any time ... (8) Whenever an offense
involves family violence .... "); IDAHO CODE § 19-603 (Supp. 1993) ("A peace
officer ... may, without a warrant, arrest a person: ... 6. When at the scene of a
domestic disturbance there is reasonable cause to believe, based upon physical evidence
observed by the officer or statements made in the presence of the officer upon
immediate response to a report of a commission of such a crime, that the person
arrested has committed an assault or battery."); IOWA CODE § 804.7 (1993) ("A peace
officer may make an arrest ... without a warrant ... 5. If the peace officer has
reasonable grounds for believing that domestic abuse ... has occurred and has
reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be arrested committed it."); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-1-7 (Michie 1984) ("a peace officer may arrest a person and take that
person into custody without a warrant when the officer is at the scene of a domestic
disturbance and has probable cause to believe that the person has committed an assault
or a battery upon a family or household member."); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
81-113 (Michie Supp. 1993) (provides for warrantless arrests for domestic abuse);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West Supp. 1993) (allowing warrantless arrests for
domestic violence); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7(3) (Supp. 1992) (warrantless arrests
permissible for acts of domestic violence); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.3B (West
Supp. 1994) (warrantless arrests permissible on probable cause for acts of domestic
abuse "within the preceding four (4) hours"); id tit. 22 § 196 (West 1992) (same);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-3-2.1 (Supp. 1993); WYo. STAT. § 7-20-102 (Supp.
1992) (permits warrantless arrests where a peace officer "has probable cause to believe
that" domestic violence has occurred).
22. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-3 (Supp. 1993) ("(a) An officer may arrest any
person without a warrant, on any day and at any time... (7) When he has reasonable
cause to believe that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed by the person
arrested in violation of a protective order ..... ); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15 (West
Supp. 1993) ("(6) There is probable cause to believe that the person has [violated a
protective order]"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594.10 (1986 & Supp. 1992) ("(1) An
arrest by a peace officer without a warrant on a charge of a misdemeanor or a
violation is lawful whenever: ... (b) He has probable cause to believe that the person
to be arrested ... has within the last six hours violated a temporary or permanent
protective order... ."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15 (1991) ("1. A law enforcement
officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person: ... g. For the offense of violating a
protection order . .. ."); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3 (Supp. 1993) ("(a) A law enforcement
officer may arrest without a warrant a person... (2) When the officer has probable
cause to believe the person has [violated a protective order] .. . ."); see also MICH.
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 764.15b (West Supp. 1993) (allowing warrantless arrests for
violations of "injunctive orders").
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the Constitution.' In fact, very few courts have said anything significant
about the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and the common law
rule." This Article will examine the constitutional questions raised by the
23. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756 (1984) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court has "never held that a warrant is constitutionally required to
arrest for nonfelony offenses occurring out of the officer's presence" and stating that
this rule "is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment."); see also Maryland v. Macon,
472 U.S. 463, 471 (1985) ("We leave to another day the question whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits a warrantless arrest for the state law misdemeanor of distribution
of obscene materials.").
24. Most statements of the common law rule governing warrantless arrests for
misdemeanors omit the requirement that the arrest be made immediately. But see
Commonwealth v. Conway, 316 N.E.2d 757, 759 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974). However,
most statements of the common law rule refer to the necessity of a breach of the peace
committed in the arresting officer's presence. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925) ("In cases of misdemeanor, a peace officer like a private
person has at common law no power of arresting without a warrant except when a
breach of the peace has been committed in his presence or there is reasonable ground
for supposing that a breach of the peace is about to be committed or. renewed in his
presence.") (quoting HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND, Vol. 9, part III, at 612.);
Higbee v. City of San Diego, 911 F.2d 377, 379 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) ("At common law
a peace officer was allowed to arrest only for a breach of the peace committed in his
presence."); Howes v. State, 503 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Alaska 1972) ("At common law a
police officer was authorized to arrest without a warrant anyone who had committed
a misdemeanor in his presence amounting to a breach of the peace."); Shanley v.
Wells, 71 Ill. 78, 82 (1873) (a "policeman has no authority to make an arrest without
a warrant" except for a felony or breach of the peace); Prosser v. Parsons, 141 S.E.2d
342, 345 (S.C. 1965) ("At common law.., peace officers had the power and authority
to arrest without warrant felons or persons reasonably suspected of having committed
a felony and also those who had committed a misdemeanor in his presence which
amounted to a breach of the peace."); SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 5-1(b),
at 396 ("The common law rule with respect to misdemeanors was... [that a] warrant
was required except when a breach of the peace occurred in the presence of the
arresting officer."); Hastings, supra note 5, at 61, 66, 71, 83, 86 (stating that this was
the common law rule in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Vermont); Wilgus, supra note 4, at 673-74, 703-06; see also TORCIA, supra note 7,
§ 60, at 297-98 (citing cases). Some authorities state the common law rule in a way
that omits any mention of the breach of the peace requirement. See, e.g., Welsh, 466
U.S. at 756 ("At common law 'a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a
warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony
not committed in his presence if there was reasonable grounds for making the arrest."')
(White, J., dissenting) (quoting-United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976));
Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 534 (1900) ("[A]n officer, at common law,
was not authorized to make an arrest without a warrant, for a mere misdemeanor not
committed in his presence."); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 498-99 (1885) ("By the
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continuing expansion of the power to make warrantless arrests for misdemean-
ors.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE COMMON LAW RULE
The rule barring warrantless misdemeanor arrests originated in England.
In 1710, in Regina v. Tooley,'5 Lord Holt summarized the English rule with
the statement that "a constable cannot arrest, but when he sees an actual
breach of the peace; and if the affray be over, he cannot arrest. 26 In 1835,
in Cook v. Nethercote,27 it was said:
If, however, there had been an affray, and that affray were
over, then the constable had not and ought not to have the power
of apprehending the persons engaged in it; for the power is given
him by law to prevent a breach of the peace; and where a breach
of the peace has been committed, and was over, the constable
must proceed in the same way as any other person, namely; by
obtaining a warrant from a magistrate.28
A similar rule barred warrantless misdemeanor arrests by private citizens.
In a decision that one authority referred to as "[t]he leading case holding that
a private person may not arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant,"29 an
English court held "that a private person could not justify giving another into
custody on suspicion of a misdemeanor."30 Even if a misdemeanor took
place in another's presence, that person could not make an arrest if no breach
of the peace was involved." Moreover, a citizen could not justify a
wrongful arrest by showing probable cause or a good faith, reasonable belief
that the arrestee was guilty. Instead, it needed to be shown that the arrestee
actually was guilty.32
common law of England, neither a civil officer nor a private citizen had the right
without a warrant to make an arrest for a crime not committed in his presence, except
in the case of felony, and then only for the purpose of bringing the offender before a
civil magistrate."); ARREST, supra note 9, at 17-19.
25. 2 Lord Raymond 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (1710).
26. 2 Lord Raymond at 1301, 92 Eng. Rep. at 352.
27. 6 Car. & P. 741, 172 Eng. Rep. 1443 (1835).
28. 6 Car. & P. at 744, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1445.
29. Wilgus, supra note 4, at 707.
30. Fox v. Gaunt, 3 Barn & Ad. 798, 799, 110 Eng. Rep. 293 (1832). But cf.
Holyday v. Oxenbridge, 79 Eng. Rep. 805 (1631) (holding that one person could arrest
another who was a common gambler and who had cheated him using false dice).
31. Mathews v. Biddulph, 3 Man. & G. 390, 133 Eng. Rep. 1195 (1841).
32. Wilgus, supra note 4, at 708 (citing cases).
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The English common law "permitted immediate arrest of those commit-
ting or threatening to commit a breach of the peace in order to protect the
people of the community from acts of violence. But after the disturbance was
over, the primary reason for permitting restraint of the offenders disap-
peared."33 Arrests were "made not so much for the purpose of bringing the
offender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest was
accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was taken in
the act or immediately after its commission."34
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF WARRANTLESS
MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS
A. State and Lower Federal Courts
With the growth of organized police forces in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centures,35 most American jurisdictions attempted to expand
the common law arrest powers. Because the Fourth Amendment was not
considered applicable to the states until the United States Supreme Court's
1949 decision in Wolfv. Colorado,36 challenges to these efforts were almost
always based on state constitutions and were heard in the state courts. Few
early decisions consideredthe impact of the Fourth Amendment on warrantless
misdemeanor arrests.
33. FISHER, supra note 4, at 188.
34. People v. Phillips, 30 N.E.2d 488, 489 (N.Y. 1940) (citing cases); see also
FISHER, supra note 4, at 188-89.
35. Police officers were "unknown to the common law." State v. Freeman, 86
N.C. 683, 684 (1882).
36. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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Only a few courts have found attempts to eliminate the breach of the
peace requirement constitutionally unacceptable. 7 Most courts have found
no constitutional bar to the elimination of this requirement. 8
The judicial response to attempts to eliminate the in-the-presence
requirement has been mixed. Several state courts have held unconstitutional
statutes purporting to authorize warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not
37. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Verberg, 44 N.W. 579, 582-83 (Mich. 1889) (holding
unconstitutional a law that permitted warrantless arrests "upon view, [of] any person
found in the act of committing any offense against the laws of the state;... Any law
which would place the keeping and safe conduct of another in the hands of even a
[peace officer] . . . , unless for some breach of the peace committed in his presence,
or upon suspicion of felony, would be most oppressive and unjust, and destroy all the
rights which our constitution guaranties.... An arrest for [a] misdemeanor, without
a warrant, by one who does not see the offense committed, is illegal."); see also
Stittgen v. Rundle, 74 N.W. 536, 537 (Wis. 1898) (observing, in a civil action for false
imprisonment, that the jury was correctly instructed that arrest without a warrant is
lawful only for felonies and "breaches of the peace committed in the presence of the
officer," but noting that the ordinance which supposedly authorized the arrest was not
introduced in evidence)); cf. Staker v. United States, 5 F.2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1925)
("[1]t may be questioned whether, in cases of misdemeanor, a peace officer or a private
person has any power of arresting without a warrant, except when a breach of peace
has been committed in his presence, or there is reasonable ground for supposing that
a breach of peace is about to be committed or renewed in his presence.").
38. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Eastman, 59 N.W. 817, 819-20 (Mich. 1894)
(upholding right of peace officers to make warrantless arrests for offenses not
involving breach of the peace committed in their presence) (citing numerous cases
where "the power to authorize arrest on view for offenses not amounting to breaches
of the peace has been affirmed"); Oleson v. Pincock, 251 P. 23, 25 (Utah 1926)
(holding valid, without questioning its constitutionality, a statute which was "broader
than the common law, since it provides that one may be arrested for any public offense
if committed or attempted in the presence of the officer."); White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St.
550, 554 (1860) (ordinance authorizing the arrest upon view, without a warrant, of any
person violating the ordinance is valid); see also Higbee v. City of San Diego, 911
F.2d 377, 379 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) ("court cases and statute[s] ... allow arrest for
any offense committed in the presence of the police officer. ... This practice has
never been successfully challenged and stands as the law of the land.").
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committed in the presence of the arresting officer. 9 Other courts have
upheld statutes that removed the in-the-presence requirement.40
Courts that have ruled on the constitutional issues raised by attempts to
expand the power to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests have not always
clearly explained their holdings. Frequently, their opinions contain more
rhetoric than analysis. In the early part of this century, state courts that
refused to permit the expansion of the common law powers of arrest
sometimes took the position that expanded powers to make warrantless arrests
gave the police unfettered discretion to act on vague and arbitrary grounds and
39. See, e.g., Ex parte Rhodes, 79 So. 462, 462-63 (Ala. 1918) (holding
unconstitutional statute which the court said authorized misdemeanor arrests without
a warrant "on a mere verbal request of any ... citizen"); In re Kellam, 41 P. 960, 961
(Kan. 1895) (holding unconstitutional a statute which purported to authorize
warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not committed in the officer's presence); Polk v.
State, 142 So. 480, 481 (Miss. 1932) (holding statute unconstitutional "in so far as it
authorizes an arrest, without a warrant, for a misdemeanor not committed in the
presence of the officer making the arrest..."); Gunderson v. Struebing, 104 N.W.
149, 151 (Wis. 1905) (stating, in a civil action for false imprisonment that city council
"could authorize its police officers to arrest without warrant only in cases where,
independent of its charter, such arrest might be made" and holding invalid, as being
contrary to "the principles of the common law" an ordinance which purported to
authorize the arrest without a warrant of persons suspected of misdemeanors not
committed in the presence of the arresting officer).
40. See, e.g., Hanser v. Bieber, 197 S.W. 68, 70 (Mo. 1917) (statute which was
"held to authorize a police officer ... to arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in
his presence provided he has reasonable ground to suspect that the offense has been
committed" is a proper recognition of the fact "that greater power should be given
police officers to preserve the peace and arrest offenders in cities . . . ."); Lurie v.
District Attorney of Kings County, 288 N.Y.S.2d 256,261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) ("An
arrest by a police officer or a private person for a misdemeanor or offense not
committed 'in their presence' violates no constitutional standard, state or federal.").
The Michigan courts had difficulty with this question. In People ex rel. Robison
v. Haug, 37 N.W. 21 (Mich. 1888), the court stated that "in accordance with
constitutional principles, as construed everywhere .... no arrest can be made without
warrant except in cases of felony or in cases of breaches of the peace committed in the
presence of the arresting officer" and declared unconstitutional a statute that authorized
warrantless misdemeanor arrests and stated that "this statute is practically, if carried
out, a general warrant itself ...." Id. at 25. A few years later in Burroughs, the
same court maintained that in other states "the power to authorize arrest on view for
offenses not amounting to breaches of the peace has been affirmed" and stated that
there are apparently no cases "in which the contrary doctrine has been asserted."
Borroughs, 59 N.W. at 819. However, in Tillman v. Beard, 80 N.W. 248, 248 (Mich.
1899), the court stated that "[o]fficers are justified in arresting without a warrant only
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were, "in effect, a revival of the odious general warrants."'" Other state
courts held that such arrests ran afoul of state constitutional prohibitions on
unreasonable searches and seizures.42 Most courts discussed the difficulties
inherent in arresting officers relying on hearsay43 and emphasized the
common law bar on warrantless arrests except for offenses committed in the
view of the officer and in cases of a felony actually committed.44
41. In re Kellam, 41 P. at 961 (holding unconstitutional a statute which purported
to authorize warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not committed in the officer's
presence because such arrests would be unreasonable and because the statute gave to
the police arbitrary power to exercise at their discretion and was, "in effect, a revival
of the odious general warrants."); see also People ex rel. Robison, 37 N.W. at 25-26
(declaring statute unconstitutional that provided for searches and seizures without a
legal warrant and stating that "this statute is practically, if carried out, a general
warrant itself."); Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century?
A Fourth Amendment Solution to UncheckedDiscretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses,
62 TEMP. L. Q. 221 (1989); cf. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948)
(stating that "[w]arrants of arrest are designed to meet the dangers of unlimited and
unreasonable arrests of persons who are not at the moment committing any crime").
The essence of the argument that warrantless misdemeanor arrests are akin to
general warrants seems to be that expanded warrantless arrest powers confer on the
police the power to make arrests on vague and undefined grounds which is the same
kind of unfetterd discretion and arbitrary power conferred by general warrants. See
Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 257, 286 (1984); cf Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-27 (1886).
Warrantless arrests, however, unlike activities based on a general warrant, must still
be based on probable cause. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415-416
(1976).
42. See, e.g., Polk, 142 So. at 481 ("The statute in so far as it authorizes an arrest,
without a warrant, for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the officer
making the arrest, violates section 23 of the Constitution.. ." prohibiting unreasonable
seizures or search.); Exparte Rhodes, 79 So. at 463-67 (citing cases); see also In re
Kellam, 41 P. at 961.
It has been suggested that warrantless misdemeanor arrests might offend due
process because they can result in imprisonment without conviction of crime. See
Thomas R. Folk, The Case for Constitutional Constraints Upon the Power to Make
Full Custody Arrests, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 321, 333 (1979).
43. See, e.g., In re Kellam, 412 P. at 961 ("If an arrest cannot be made or
justified on a warrant resting only on hearsay or belief, how can an arrest for a petty
offense without a warrant upon the mere suspicion of an officer, not resting even on
hearsay or belief be justified?"); People ex rel. Robison, 37 N.W. at 25 (if the
legislature could evade the constitutional requirement that there be a sworn showing
of facts personally known to the affiant that established probable cause, "by providing
for searches and seizures without legal warrant the provision would be useless").
44. See, e.g., In re Kellam, 412 P. at 961 (characterizing as unreasonable and
therefore unconstitutional a statute which purported to authorize warrantless arrests for
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Most courts that have considered the question in recent years have held
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit warrantless arrests for
misdemeanors not committed in the arresting officers' presence even when
such arrests are barred by state law.45 In 1986, however, a Seventh Circuit
opinion suggested that such arrests may violate the United States Constitu-
tion.46
misdemeanors not committed in the officer's presence, but noting that such arrests
have always been permissible for felonies "on account of the gravity of such
offenses"); Pinkerton, 44 N.W. at 582-83 (emphasizing the historical bar on such
arrests); see also Gunderson, 104 N.W. at 151 (holding invalid, as being contrary to
"the principles of the common law" an ordinance which purported to authorize the
arrest without a warrant of persons suspected of misdemeanors not committed in the
presence of the arresting officer).
45. See, e.g., Fields v. City of South Houston, Tex., 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th
Cir. 1991) ("The United States Constitution does not require a warrant [to arrest] for
misdemeanors not occurring in the presence of the arresting officer."); see also Higbee,
911 F.2d at 379; Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1990); Street v.
Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Mayo, 792 F. Supp. 768,
770-71 & n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (upholding warrantless home entry to arrest for
misdemeanor and stating that "[s]tates remain free to expand the power to arrest
without warrant... as long as the Constitution's requirement of probable cause is
met."); Boucher v. Town of Southbridge, 679 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D. Mass. 1988)
(holding that warrantless arrest for the misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated did
not "violate federal constitutional law" and observing that other courts have
"recognize[d] that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit such arrests if they are
based on probable cause."); Wilson v. Walden, 586 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (stating, without analysis, that "there is no constitutional requirement ... that
officers procure a warrant before making an arrest for a misdemeanor violation.");
Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432,439 (S.D. Ga. 1975) (stating, without analysis,
that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit arrests [for misdemeanors] committed
outside the presence of the arresting... officer"); Penn v. Commonwealth, 412 S.E.2d
189, 193 (Va. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 420 S.E.2d 713 (Va. 1992) (holding, without
analysis, that "there is no fourth amendment violation for misdemeanor arrests
committed outside the presence of the arresting state officer."); State v. Lee, 763 P.24
385, 386-87 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (stating that "the necessity of a warrant to make
a misdemeanor arrest for a crime not committed in the presence of an officer is a
requirement imposed by statute, and not the federal Constitution," and holding that
statute permitting warrantless arrest, did not, "at least as applied to these facts...
authorize the unreasonable seizure of a person.").
46. See Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 441 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1028 (1987) (noting that the Supreme Court has never ruled on this
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B The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether the
Constitution requires any aspects of the common law rule that barred most
warrantless misdemeanor arrests. In fact, only a few Supreme Court decisions
have even commented on this question, and then only in passing.
In 1900, in Bad Elk v. United States,47 the Court considered an appeal
by a defendant who had been convicted of murdering one of three police
officers who were attempting to arrest him without a warrant. In reversing the
conviction, the Court, observing that there was no evidence that the defendant
had committed an offense of any kind, said that the attempt to arrest him was
illegal and concluded that the defendant "was undoubtedly prejudiced" by a
jury charge that had suggested that he had no right to resist "an attempted
illegal arrest"' 48 The Court noted that "an officer, at common law, was not
authorized to make an arrest without a warrant, for a mere misdemeanor not
cbmmitted in his presence. 49
In 1925, in Carroll v. United States,"° the defendants contended that
two bottles of liquor were improperly introduced into evidence at their trial.
The defendants argued that if an arrest is made as a result of a seizure, "the
right of seizure should be limited by the common law rule as to the circum-
stances justifying an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor. "' The
Court alluded to "the common-law rule" that a police officer may "only arrest
without a warrant one guilty of a misdemeanor if committed in his pres-
ence,"52 but avoided addressing the legality of the arrest. Instead, the Court
47. 177 U.S. 529 (1900). In Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 498-99 (1885), the
Court observed in passing that "[b]y the common law of England, neither a civil
officer nor a private citizen had the right ... to make an arrest for a crime not
committed in his presence, except in the case of felony, and then only for the purpose
of bringing the offender before a civil magistrate."
48. BadElk, 177 U.S. at 537-38. The Court stated that the jury should have been
instructed that the defendant had "the right to use such force as was absolutely
necessary to resist an attempted illegal arrest." Id. at 537.
49. Id. at 534. The Court stated that "[w]e do not find any statute of the United
States or of the State of South Dakota giving any right to these men to arrest an
individual without a warrant on a charge of misdemeanor not committed in their
presence." Id. at 535.
50. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
51. Id. at 156.
52. Id. at 156-57. Two years after Carroll it was said that "[i]t is difficult to see
how the Carroll case can be taken as authority for the proposition that an arrest can
be made by a peace officer without warrant for a misdemeanor less than a breach of
the peace," but noted that "the case has been taken to stand for that proposition by
some Federal courts." See Bohlen & Shulman, supra note 8, at 488.
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held that the liquor was properly seized because the officers had probable
cause to believe that the defendants were carrying liquor in their car.53
Except for one passing reference in 1948 to a Washington state statute,54
the Supreme Court did not again mention warrantless arrests55 for misde-
meanors until 1976. In United States v. Watson,56 the Court upheld a
warrantless, public felony arrest made pursuant to a federal law authorizing
"arrests without warrant for felonies" if there are "reasonable grounds to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such a
felony."57  The majority took the position that the Court's prior cases
construing the Fourth Amendment reflected "the ancient common-law rule that
a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor
or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in
his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest. 58 In
addition, the majority observed that the rule "authorizing felony arresis on
probable cause, but without a warrant, has survived substantially intact.., in
almost all of the States," was the rule recommended by the American Law
Institute, and "is the rule Congress has long directed its principal law
53. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161-62. Justice McReynolds noted in dissent that the
Court was not "now concerned with... whether by apt words Congress might have
authorized the arrest without a warrant. It has not attempted to do this." Id at 164
(McReynolds, J., dissenting).
54. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), the Court stated in passing
that narcotics agents could have made a warrantless arrest of the defendant only "for
a crime committed in the presence of the arresting officer or for a felony of which he
had reasonable cause to believe defendant guilty." Id at 15. In a footnote the Court
observed that this was "the Washington [state] law," and said that "[s]tate law
determines the validity of arrests without warrant." id at 15 n.5. The Court said
nothing about the Washington law's constitutionality.
In a 1946 case, Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, stated that "[tihe common law rule
restricted arrest without warrant for a misdemeanor to those acts which were breaches
of the peace." Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 610 n.4 (1946) (Frankfurter J.,
dissenting).
55. In 1975, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment requires that a person arrested without a warrant be given a
prompt, fair, and reliable judicial "determination of probable cause as a prerequisite
to extended restraint of liberty following arrest." Id. at 114; see also County of
Riverside v McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1670 (1991) (holding that 'Judicial
determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter,
comply with ... Gerstein.").
56. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
57. Id. at 415 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3)). See generally Ralph J. Colleli,
Jr., Recent Development, Warrantless Arrests by Police Survive a Constitutional
Challenge-United States v. Watson, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 193 (1976).
58. Watson, 423 U.S. at 418.
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enforcement 6fficers to follow."59 The Court noted the advantages of arrest
warrants," but specifically declined to transform its preference for such
warrants "into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and
Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on
probable cause rather than to encumber criminal prosecutions with endless
litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances."'"
In Welsh v. Wisconsin,62 the Court held unconstitutional a warrantless
entry into a suspect's home to arrest him for a civil traffic offense.63 Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court focused on whether any exigencies were
present that might have justified a warrantless arrest and stated that "an
important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency
exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being
made."' In dissent, Justice White took note of the common law rule barring
warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not committed in the arresting officer's
presence and expressed the view that this rule "is not grounded in the Fourth
Amendment."65 The majority, however, never mentioned this rule. Instead,
Justice Brennan stated that the majority's approach was "required by the
Fourth Amendment prohibition on 'unreasonable searches and seizures.'
'i
66
59. Id. at 421-23.
60. The Court observed that the judgments of law enforcement officers "about
probable cause may be more readily accepted where backed by a warrant." Id. at 423.
61. Id.
62. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
63. Id. at 754. The majority opinion by Justice Brennan noted that warrantless
home arrests, even with probable cause, are barred absent exigent circumstances.
Justice Brennan's opinion implicitly acknowledged the existence of probable cause and
analyzed the entry largely in terms of whether exigent circumstances were present. It
concluded that a warrantless entry into a person's home to effectuate that person's
arrest "should rarely be sanctioned" if the arrest is to be made for a "minor offense."
Id. at 753.
64. Id
65. Id at 756 (White, J., dissenting); see also SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note
9, § 5.1, at 403 (citing Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1974), for the
proposition that "the common law requirement of a warrant for a misdemeanor not
occurring in the presence ... is ... not grounded in the Fourth Amendment.").
66. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. In Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985), the
Court stated "[w]e leave to another day the question whether the Fourth Amendment
prohibits a warrantless arrest for the state law misdemeanor of distribution of obscene
materials." Id. at 471.
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ARREST
Any arrest has a profound and long-lasting effect on the arrestee'
Even if an arrest is for a minor offense, and charges against the arrestee are
ultimately dropped or the arrestee is acquitted, the records of the arrest
probably will be retained and disseminated. 8 Moreover, widespread public
feeling that "where there's smoke, there's fire" often leaves a cloud of
suspicion hanging over an arrestee even if no conviction follows.69 The
67. Often, an arrest will have far more serious consequences than a search. See
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("A search
may cause only annoyance and temporary inconvenience to the law-abiding citizen
.... An arrest, however, is a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the
person seized is guilty or innocent."); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776 (1969)
(White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he invasion and disruption of a man's life and privacy
which stem from his arrest are ordinarily far greater than the relatively minor
intrusions attending a search of his premises."); Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Personal
Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. Cr. REV. 46, 46-47
n.2; see also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978) ("An arrest... is a serious
matter for any person even when no prosecution follows or when an acquittal is
obtained.")
68. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/3(A) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (requiring
retention of arrest information and its dissemination "to peace officers of the United
States, of other states or territories, of the Insular possessions of the United States, of
foreign countries duly authorized to receive the same, [and] to all peace officers of the
State of Illinois."); Barrett, supra note 67, at 47 n.2; Donald L. Dorenberg & Donald
H. Zeigler, Due Process Versus Data Processing: An Analysis of Computerized
Criminal History Information Systems, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1110, 1114 (1980)
(observing that arrest records are generally maintained even when the arrestee is
acquitted or the charges against him dismissed); Lawrence G. Newman, Note,
Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 850, 852-53 (1971). But cf N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 160.50 (McKinney's
1992) (specifying procedures for the return of fingerprints and photographs and
providing that if a criminal action terminates in favor of an accused the record shall
be sealed).
Some courts have held that because a disproportionate number of blacks are
arrested, the use of arrest records is discriminatory. See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton
Systems, Inc., 316 F.Supp. 401,403 (C.D. Cal. 1970),judgment modified by 472 F.2d
631 (9th Cir. 1972) (Title VII); see also Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 326 (8th
Cir. 1971) (due process).
69. See In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
858 (1947) ("The stigma [of a wrongful arrest] cannot be easily erased... [and] is
seldom wiped out by a subsequent judgment of not guilty. Frequently, the public
remembers the accusation, and still suspects guilt, even after an acquittal."); see also
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result will often be lost employment opportunities and future law enforcement
scrutiny.
70
A custodial arrest is an especially "awesome and frightening" experi-
ence.72 The arrestee is abruptly constrained73 and usually searched,74 even
70. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[A]n
indictment will often have a devastating personal and professional impact that a later
dismissal or acquittal can never undo."); Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp.
1163, 1166-69 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd, 478 F.2d 471 (3rd. Cir. 1973) (acknowledging
that former security manager who was charged with employee theft but found not
guilty, was thereafter unable "to obtain employment in the security field."); cf Dowling
v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 344-45 (1990) (holding that the mere fact that a person
has been acquitted of a particular offense does not necessarily render evidence of that
offense inadmissible as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief in a subsequent
prosecution for another offense); Smith v. State, 409 So.2d 455, 457 (Ala. Crim. App.
1981) (same).
Some employers will not hire applicants who have a record of arrests for
anything other than minor traffic violations. See, e.g., Gregory, 316 F. Supp. at 403.
Applicants for most professional licenses, including bar applicants, must
ordinarily acknowledge all arrests without regard to their final disposition. See
generally, Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE
L.J. 491, 520-21 (1985).
71. Most authorities agree that there is a difference between custodial arrests and
arrests made by means of a ticket or a summons. See, e.g., People v. Dandrea, 736
P.2d 1211, 1215 n.7 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (distinguishing between protective custody
and custodial arrests and stating that "[a]n arrest of a person upon probable cause of
having committed a crime for the purpose of taking the person to police facilities for
booking is considered a 'custodial arrest'."); Pittman v. State, 541 So.2d 583, 585 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1989) (a traffic stop and "requiring a motorist to sit in a patrol car while
the officer completes... [a ticket] does not constitute a custodial arrest"); see also
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (noting several times that defendant
was searched incident to his custodial arrest); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
235 n.6 (1973) (emphasizing that search was incident to a full custody arrest as
opposed to the simple issuance of a notice of violation). But see Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 450 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I am not familiar with
any difference between custodial arrests and any other kind of arrests.").
72. See ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 120.1,
Commentary at 290-91 (1975) ("Being arrested and held by the police, even if for a
few hours, is, for most persons, awesome and frightening."); cf Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious
than the interference occasioned by arrest.").
73. See ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 72, Commentary at 291 (observing that
an arrest is ordered "on the spot" by a policeman who "stands ready then and there to
back [it] up with force.").
74. See, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-68 (recognizing right to search incident to
arrest and defining permissible scope of such searches).
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if the arrest is for a minor offense." He is then forcibly taken to an
unfamiliar place, booked,76 fingerprinted,77 photographed, 8 searched more
extensively,79 and held in jail,80 possibly under unsanitary and unsafe
conditions,8 ' until, and unless, he can obtain his release. The arrestee may
75. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260,266 (1973) (full search incident
to arrest permissible where defendant was subjected to custodial arrest for driving
without a valid operator's license in his possession); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236 (full
search incident to custodial arrest permissible where defendant was arrested for driving
after revocation); see also Salken, supra note 41, at 223.
76. See Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 605 (1968) (Warren,
C.J., dissenting) (observing that "booking" is required in most jurisdictions and
describing "booking" as "an administrative record of an arrest... made on the police
'arrest book' indicating, generally, the name of the person arrested, the date and time
of the arrest or booking, the offense for which he was arrested, and other informa-
tion"); ARREST, supra note 9, at 379-82 (discussing booking procedures).
77. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.10 (McKinney's 1992).
78. See, e.g., State v. Klinker, 537 P.2d 268, 275 (Wash. 1975); 20 ILL. CoMP.
STAT. ANN. 2630/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("The Department [of State Police] shall
procure and file for record ... photographs, ... measurements, descriptions and
information of all persons who have been arrested [in this state]."); see also Newman,
supra note 68, at 850-51 ("The practice of taking fingerprints, photographs, and other
identification data of every person arrested by local, state, and federal law enforcement
officers ... is well established.").
79. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (upholding station house
search of person arrested for disorderly conduct). But cf State v. Jetty, 579 P.2d 1228,
1229-30 (Mont. 1978) (where "local resident, [was] arrested at 3 a.m. for failure to pay
an overdue one dollar parking ticket" and never booked, it was unconstitutional to
search him for weapons and contraband prior to placing him in a holding cell).
Occasionally, persons arrested for minor offenses have been stripped searched.
See, e.g., Hill v. Bogan, 735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding unreasonable strip
search of person detained for a traffic offense); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723
F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding unreasonable strip search of person briefly
detained for nondangerous misdemeanors).
80. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Richman Gordman, Inc., 215 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Neb.
1974) (plaintiffs were "confined in the local jail for 3 1/2 to 4 hours, fingerprinted and
'mugged' for permanent FBI records, charged with a criminal offense, and compelled
to retain counsel for their defense").
81. Mireya Navarro, As Suspects Wait, the Fear of Tuberculosis Rises, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 30, 1992, at B1 (observing that persons held in New York City jails are
at risk of contracting tuberculosis); see William Glaberson, Trapped in the Terror of
New York's Holding Pens, N.Y. TIMEs, March 23, 1990, at Al.
One author has expressed the view that the in-the-presence requirement for
misdemeanor arrests grew out of an early nineteenth century recognition of "[t]he
deplorable conditions of jails and the resulting need to protect individuals from
mistaken or arbitrary arrest." Roach, supra note 8, at 120 n.8 (citing David Kauffman,
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suffer emotional distress82 and public humiliation,83 and may lose contact
with family and friends.' He may lose time from work and will probably
be required to retain an attorney and spend money on bail.85 If the detention
is at all prolonged, he may lose his job or suffer other adverse consequenc-
es.
86
If a person charged with a misdemeanor is subjected to a custodial arrest,
that arrest is likely to be the major consequence suffered by that person.8
Because the consequences of an arrest are so severe,88 substantial civil
damages have been awarded to persons improperly arrested for minor
offenses.89 Some jurisdictions bar custodial arrests for some minor offens-
The Law ofArrest in Maryland, 5 MD. L. REV. 125 (1941)). It is more likely that the
"in the presence" exception for warrantless misdemeanor arrests "was essentially a
narrowly drawn exigent-circumstances exception." Watson, 423 U.S. at 440 n.8
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. See Thomas, 329 F. Supp at 1169 (noting that wrongfully arrested plaintiff
suffered injury to his feelings, humiliation, and embarrassment); see also Salken, supra
note 41 at 257 (noting the "indignity, powerlessness, and inconvenience occasioned by
a custodial arrest").
83. See, e.g., Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 596 (D. Minn. 1973);
Thomas, 329 F. Supp at 1169; see also Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d 432,
440 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028 (1987) (noting the "sheer embarrass-
ment" of an arrest).
84. See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1976).
85. If an arrestee is released on bail the "release may be accompanied by
burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty." Gerstein,420 U.S.
at 114.
86. "Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of
income, and imperil his family relationships." Id. at 114.
A custodial arrest may be particularly burdensome when the it takes place away
from the arrestee's home. See Oleson v. Pincock, 251 P. 23, 25 (Utah 1926).
87. Gramenos, 797 F.2d at 441; see also Arthur Mendelson, Arrest for Minor
Traffic Offenses, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 502, 505 (1983) (citing cases where
individuals were "arrested, handcuffed, searched, and jailed" for minor traffic
violations and noting the "unreasonableness of arresting someone for a trivial traffic
offense since it is not a crime [and], the penalty is only a fine").
88. It has been suggested that the Court is simply not realistic about the impact
of an arrest on the arrestee. Tracy Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the
Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 723, 768 (1992).
89. See, e.g., Thomas, 329 F. Supp. at 1169-71, ($750,000 jury verdict, including
$250,000 actual damages, reduced on appeal to compensatory damages of $100,000
and $50,000 in punitive damages); Gaszak v. Zayre of Illinois, Inc., 305 N.E.2d 704,
711-12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) ($10,500 verdict); Schmidt, 215 N.W.2d at 111 ($10,500
verdict reduced on appeal to $10,000).
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es ° or permit them only under limited circumstances. 9' Moreover, it has
been suggested that the Constitution bars custodial arrests for certain minor
offenses.'
90. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 810.410(3) (1991) ("A police officer: (a) shall not
arrest a person for a traffic infraction."); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 670 1d, § 148
(1977 & Supp. 1993) (mandatory to issue a summons for speeding and for consuming
an alcoholic beverage while driving); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3(c) (1993) ("A law enforce-
ment officer acting without a warrant who is authorized to arrest a person for a
misdemeanor ... shall ... issue a citation to appear ... in lieu of arrest."); cf
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 450 (1981) ("[S]tate or local regulations may in
some cases prohibit police officers from taking persons into custody for violation of
minor traffic laws.").
91. See, e.g., Burton C. Agata, Searches and Seizures Incident to Traffic
Violations-A Reply to Professor Simeone, 7 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (1962) ("mhe right
to make a summary arrest [should] be confined to a limited type of serious cases
.... "); Wayne R. LaFave, "Seizures" Typology; Classifying Detentions of the Person
to Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 417, 441-42
(1984) (suggesting the need for such limits); Salken, supra note 41, at 251 n.189
(citing statutes); see also Min. R. CRlm. P. 6.01 subd 1(1)(2) (1993); ALI MODEL
CODE, supra note 72, at § 120.2. Courts have also imposed limits. See, e.g., State v.
Hehman, 578 P.2d 527, 528 (Wash. 1978) ("We hold as a matter of public policy that
custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and impermissi-
ble if the defendant signs [a] promise to appear.... ."); State v. Klinker, 537 P.2d 268,
278 (Wash 1975) (en banc) ("where there is no special need for arrest ... , issuance
of an arrest warrant ... is constitutionally impermissible."); J.E.G. v. C.J.E., 360
N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (nd. 1977) ("[A]n arrest is reasonable only when the public good,
which may be furthered by its utilization, outweighs the deprivation of an individual's
liberty.").
92. "ITlhe Supreme Court has so far avoided passing upon this question."
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 5.1(h), at 436. However, in Gustafson, 414
U.S. at 266-67, Justice Stewart observed in a concurring opinion, that "[i]t seems to
me that a persuasive claim might have been made in this case that the custodial arrest
of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Others have made similar suggestions. See, e.g., Robinson,
414 U.S. at 238 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring); Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197
(D.C. 1987); Salken, supra, note 41, at 223, 253-54 (arguing that custodial arrests for
minor traffic violations are unconstitutional because they "are identical to the unlimited
and arbitrary power of the court's messengers and customs inspectors that led to the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment" [were not] "accepted practice at the time the
constitution was adopted," and [because] "in all cases other than intoxication, where
the driver can identify himself, the individual's interest in being free from seizure
outweighs the government's interest in enforcing the traffic laws through custodial
arrest."); cf Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1969) (suggesting that the
need for custody is a relevant factor in assessing reasonableness); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment proceeds as much by limitations upon
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V. WARRANTLESS MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Preliminary Considerations
Misdemeanor arrests, like all arrests, are constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment only if there is probable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested committed a crime.' Probable cause has been defined94 in various
ways, but recent case law indicates that the existence of probable cause is
the scope of governmental action as by imposing preconditions upon its initiation.");
Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971) (arrest of a material witness
is permissible only if there is probable cause to believe "that it may become
impracticable to secure his presence by subpoena"); State v. Brady, 388 N.W.2d 151,
155 (Wis. 1986) (arrest of a material witness violated the Fourth Amendment where
there was no showing that it was impracticable to secure his attendance by subpoena).
But cf Thomas v. State, 583 So.2d 336, 338-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), decision
approved by Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d. 468 (Fla. 1993) (not improper to arrest
defendant for violating ordinance requiring bells or gongs on bicycles).
93. SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 3.1(b), at 545 (quoting Comment,
Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U.
Cm. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961)); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) (an arrest warrant may
issue when there is "probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the defendant has committed it").
94. Probable cause is "an exceedingly difficult concept to objectify." See SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 3.2(a), at 556 (quoting Joseph G. Cook, Probable Cause
to Arrest, 24 VAND. L. REv. 317 (1971)). Probable cause is sometimes defined in
terms of the state of mind that should be possessed by the police officer about to
engage in, or by the judicial officer about to authorize, a Fourth Amendment activity.
See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (probable cause exists when "the facts
and circumstances within their [arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that... [the person to be arrested] had committed or was committing an
offense."); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925) ("The substance of all
the definitions [of probable cause] is a reasonable ground for belief in guilt.") (quoting
McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)). Probable cause has also been defined
in terms of probabilities. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32 (1983);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) ("In dealing with probable cause
however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities."). Finally, probable
cause has been said to be "the best compromise that has been found for accommodat-
ing these often opposing interests," in safeguarding "citizens from rash and unreason-
able interferences with privacy" and in seeking "to give fair leeway for enforcing the
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determined by examining the "totality of the circumstances."'95 In Illinois v.
Gates,96 the Supreme Court said that probable cause is a "'practical, nontech-
nical conception' . . . [that] ... deal[s] ... with probabilities."'  It is "a
fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts. '98
The fluid nature of probable cause suggests that the risk of mistaken
misdemeanor arrests could be reduced by requiring a higher level of
probability as a precondition to misdemeanor arrests.' Such a standard
would be consistent with the notion that probable cause is a compromise for
95. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1985) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983), Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753, 760 (1985), Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985), Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983), Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973), Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969), Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 531
(1967), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,767 (1966), and Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 33 (1963), as cases where "the question was whether the totality of the
circumstances justified a particular sort of search or seizure.").
96. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
97. Id at 231 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76).
98. Id at 232.
99. There is no inherent reason that probable cause must mean the same thing in
every setting. See Albert W. Altschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 45 U. PrIT. L. REV. 227, 252 (1984) (suggesting that probable cause as to one
thing might be different from probable cause as to another); see also Llaguno v.
Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1564-66 (7th Cir. 1985) (suggesting the appropriateness of a
variable level of probable cause in criminal investigations, depending in some cases
on the seriousness of the offense). Few cases suggest that a higher standard of
probable cause should apply where a police activity is directed against a minor offense.
Higher standards have been suggested, however, where a Fourth Amendment activity
is highly intrusive. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 69 (1967) (Stewart,
J., concurring) ("Only the most precise and rigorous standard of probable cause should
justify an intrusion of [the kind involved here]."); Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797
F.2d 432, 441 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028 (1987). Moreover, some
cases suggest that a lower standard of probable cause is appropriate where serious
offenses are concerned. See, e.g., Liaguno, 763 F.2d at 1564-66; United States v.
Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1973); see also Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause
and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH J.L. REF.
465, 503-04 (1984); and infra note 177 (citing authorities).
In Camara, it was held that a warrant for certain kinds of administrative searches
could be issued on the basis of a type of probable cause different from the probable
cause required for ordinary searches and seizures. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538-39. In
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 n.4 (1987), however, the Court pointed to
Camara as a case where "we use[d] ... [probable cause] as referring not to a quantum
of evidence, but merely to a requirement of reasonableness."
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balancing competing interests."° By defining an offense as a misdemeanor,
the legislature makes an implicit statement that the governmental interest in
arresting and convicting people of that offense is relatively minor.' Thus,
evidence that might be sufficient to justify actions directed at serious offenders
might not be sufficient to justify actions directed against minor offenders.,'
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the notion of a variable standard
of probable cause, 3 and has said that a "single familiar standard is essential
to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect
100. See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208 (the requirement of probable cause represents
"the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification
necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest 'reasonable' under the
fourth amendment"); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176 (probable cause has been said to be
"the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing
interests" in safeguarding "citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with
privacy" and in seeking "to give fair leeway for enforcing the law.").
101. See State v. Flowers, 441 So. 2d 707, 713 n.1 (La. 1983) ("The governmen-
tal or public interest in the prevention of serious or violent crimes, and the quick
apprehension of those who commit this type of offense is generally stronger than that
which exists when an individual commits, or is suspected of having committed, a
nonviolent or possessory offense."); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750-
54 (1984); Lankford v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 729 P.2d 822, 829
(Cal. 1987).
102. See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonable-
ness Standard of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 119, 138 (1989).
It could be argued that where the offense under investigation is minor, the
consequences of conviction are reduced and government activities directed at
apprehension and conviction are less hostile and more readily justified. Cf SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 9.1(d) at 342 (stating in the context of stop and frisk
theory, that "it may be postulated that less evidence is needed to meet the probable
cause test when the consequences for the individual are less serious"); see also Ronald
F. Wright, Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93
YALE L.J. 1127, 1136 & n.51 (1984) (suggesting that if the reasoning of Camara v.
Municipal Court were applied to criminal law enforcement activities the requirements
for Fourth Amendment activities would be more demanding when the activities were
directed at serious offenses and less demanding when the activities were directed
toward minor offenses).
103. See, e.g., New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 875 (1986) (holding that
"an application for a warrant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively
protected by the First Amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of
probable cause used to review warrant applications generally"); see also Griffin, 483
U.S. at 877 n.4 (pointing to Camara as an illustration of where "we use" probable
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on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront."'"
The risk of erroneous misdemeanor arrests could also be reduced by
enhancing the trustworthiness of the information on which such arrests are
based. "[P]robable cause[,] is dependent upon both the content of information
possessed by police and its degree of reliability.""1 5 Limiting warrantless
misdemeanor arrests to those offenses committed in the arresting officer's
presence insures that those arrests will not be made on the basis of hearsay or
on the basis of information received from third parties."°6 Viewing the in-
the-presence requirement as a necessary element of probable cause would
appear, however, to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's view that "rigid
legal rules are ill-suited" to probable cause determinations. 07 If, as the
Court has said, the reliability of information and the basis of an informant's
knowledge are merely "relevant considerations in the totality of circumstances
analysis,"' then the commission of the offense outside the officer's
104. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213-14.
105. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
106. See Gramenos, 797 F.2d at 441 (making certain that "the officer has seen the
crime committed.., greatly reduces the chance of mistaken arrest"); People v. Dixon,
222 N.W.2d 749, 751 (Mich. 1974) ("Whatever may have been its historical origins,
we perceive the principal present day importance of the presence requirement to be
that a police officer may not utilize information received from third persons as a basis
for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest."); Penn v. Commonwealth, 412 S.E.2d 189, 191
(Va. Ct. App. 1991), af'd, 420 S.E.2d 713 (Va. 1992) ("The purpose behind the
presence requirement is to prevent officers from making warrantless misdemeanor
arrests based on information received from third parties."); see also United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411,426-27 n.1 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (observing that there
is no reason to require a warrant where an offense is committed in the officer's
presence; "such an arrest presents no danger that an innocent person might be
ensnared, since the officer observes both the crime and culprit with his own eyes.");
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (the dangers of unlimited and
unreasonable arrests "are not present where a felony plainly occurs before the eyes of
an officer of the law."); Roach, supra note 8, at 120 n.8 (suggesting that the in-the-
presence requirement arose out of a "need to protect the individual from mistaken or
arbitrary arrest"); cf People v. Donnelly, 691 P.2d 747, 749 (Colo. 1984) (no probable
cause for arrest where there was no showing that citizen informant "had a basis,
through observation or otherwise, for the conclusion").
It is clear that hearsay can be used to establish probable cause. FED R. CRIM. P.
4(b), 41(c)(1); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-13 & n.4 (1959).
107. Gates, 462 U. S. at 232.
108. See id. at 230 ("[A]n informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and 'basis of
knowledge' are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report."); Roach,
supra note 8, at 125 ("The presence requirement... [seems] to be but one method by
which 'probable cause' can be found.").
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presence should militate against the presence of probable cause, but should not
inevitably be fatal.
Even if a seizure is premised on probable cause, it may nonetheless be
unconstitutional because it was not conducted pursuant to a warrant109
Moreover, because "the Fourth Amendment's protections against 'unreasonable
... seizures' includes seizures of the person,""10 a seizure may be unconstitu-
tional because it is unreasonable."'
The Supreme Court has had great difficulty in settling on a single theory
as to the- precise relationship between the reasonableness clause and the
warrant clause."' As Justice Scalia observed in a concurring opinion in
109. See, e.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587
(1980). The use of a warrant may, in some cases, reduce the protections afforded by
the probable cause requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
109 (1965) ("the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants"); see also Watson, 423 U.S.
at 423 (same).
110. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1549 (1991).
111. See e.g. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see also Payton, 445 U.S.
at 586 (stating that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.").
112. Numerous observers have commented on the inability of the Supreme Court
to settle on a single theory as to the precise relationship between the reasonableness
clause and the warrant clause. See, e.g., Daniel M. Harris, The Supreme Court's
Search and Seizure Decisions of the 1982 Term: the Emergence of A New Theory of
the Fourth Amendment, 36 BAYLOR L. REv. 41, 41-46 (1984); James A. McKenna,
The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth
Amendment, 53 IND. L.J. 55, 81-82 (1977); Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 871-73 (1985) (noting two lines of
decisions); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing The
MischiefofCamara andTerry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 398 (1988) ("The Court's basic
inability to agree on when to use a reasonableness standard instead of traditional
probable cause evidences its failure in defining the relationship between the warrant
and reasonableness clauses."); Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn, supra note 102, at 131-
40; Wasserstrom, supra note 41, at 281-82; Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the
Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Ci. L. REV. 47, 48, 70 (1974) (noting the "constantly
shifting relationship between the amendment's two clauses" and observing that "tihe
Courts have said little of lasting significance about the relationship between the two
clauses").
The Court sometimes refers to both theories in the same case. See, e.g., United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983) (stating that "[o]ur focus in
this area of Fourth Amendment law has been on the question of the 'reasonableness'
of the type of governmental intrusion involved," but then noting "the overarching
principle of 'reasonableness' embodied in the Fourth Amendment"); South Dakota v.
Opperman 428 U.S. 364, 369-70, 373 n.5 (1976) (seemingly espousing both theories
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1991, the Court's "jurisprudence [has] lurched back and forth between
imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness
alone.""' On some occasions, the Court has appeared to take the position
that all Fourth Amendment activities must be reasonable and that the Fourth
Amendment's requirements of probable cause and a warrant bear on what is
reasonable." 4 On other occasions, the Court has suggested that reasonable-
ness is a distinct analytic approach to Fourth Amendment problems that is
appropriate only in certain settings."' In recent years, it appears that the
in the same opinion).
113. Califomiav. Acevedo, Ill S. Ct. 1982, 1992(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
114. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) ("[In order
to render the instant search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant
was required."); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-18
(1972) (stating that reasonableness is a term which derives content and meaning
through reference to the warrant clause, and arguing that "the definition of
'reasonableness' turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of the warrant
clause."); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 n.1 (1983) (stating that the Court has
explained Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967), as a case where "the Court
held the test to be, not whether it was reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search itself was reasonable."); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257
(1979) (a search authorized by a warrant must be reasonable); see also Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,619 (1989) ("The Fourth Amendment
... proscribe[s] ... only those [searches and seizures] that are unreasonable .... In
most criminal cases, . . . a search or seizure ... is not reasonable unless it is
accomplished pursuant to ajudicial warrant issued upon probable cause."); Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985) (ruling that a Fourth Amendment activity may be
unreasonable even if supported by probable cause); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 337 (1985) (stating that "the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is
always that searches and seizures be reasonable."); cf Steagald, 451 U.S. at 224;
(Rehnquist J., dissenting) ("Here, as in all Fourth Amendment cases, 'reasonableness
is still the ultimate standard."') (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 539); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 721 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I am concerned,
however, with what appears to me to be an emerging tendency on the part of the Court
to convert the Teny decision into a general statement that the Fourth Amendment
requires only that any seizure be reasonable"); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
Occasionally, the Court has implied that reasonableness should be determined by
ad hoc balancing in each individual case. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see also
Wasserstrom, supra note 41, at 321 (suggesting that some members of the Court want
to return to this interpretation).
115. See, e.g., Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5 (stating that "[Ihe standard of
probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine, non-criminal
procedures ... [where the] analysis centers upon the reasonableness of the proce-
dure"); see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 584-85 (emphasizing that the amendment contains
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preference for a warrant has won out rhetorically while the reasonableness
requirement has won out in practice.'
6
B. Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth
Amendment's Reasonableness Requirement
1. Reasonableness and the Common Law
a. Generally
In 1991, in California v. Hodari D.,"7 the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that it has often looked to the common law in evaluating the reason-
ableness of police activity for Fourth Amendment purposes."' As long ago
as 1925, in Carroll v. United States,"9 the Court said that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreason-
able search and seizure when it was adopted."'20 In Gerstein v. Pugh,'
the Court observed that "the common law... has guided interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment."" In Payton v. New York," the Court placed great
emphasis on the historical bar on warrantless felony arrests in the home and
constitutionalized that rule even though many states did not follow it. 24
two separate clauses and stating that "the warrantless arrest of a person is a species of
seizure required by the Amendment to be reasonable"). If reasonableness is a distinct
approach to only some Fourth Amendment problems, it is necessary to first categorize
the intrusion in question to decide if it is sufficiently distinct from other kinds of
intrusions or other kinds of interests to warrant this distinct approach. See generally,
LaFave, supra note 91.
116. SeeAcevedo, III S. Ct. at 1992-93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
117. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
118. See id at 1551 n.2 (observing that "[w]e have consulted the common-law
to explain the meaning of seizure. . . ."); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13
(1985) ("[Tihis Court has often looked to the common law in evaluating the
reasonableness, for Fourth Amendment purposes, of police activity."); 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUMON 748 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray &
Company 1833) (the Fourth Amendment "is little more than the affirmance of a great
constitutional doctrine of the common law.").
119. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
120. Id at 149 (quoted with approval in United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,
619 n.14 (1977)).
121. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
122. Id. at 114.
123. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
124. Id at 591-98. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment "prohibits the
police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in
[Vol. 58
38
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss4/1
WARRANTLESS MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS
In United States v. Watson,"2 the Supreme Court relied heavily on
historical practices in upholding a warrantless felony arrest made by Postal
Inspectors pursuant to a statute that authorized such arrests. The Court
referred to "the common-law rule authorizing [public] arrests without a
warrant,"'126 and emphasized that "cases construing the Fourth Amendment
... reflect the ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to
arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if there was
reasonable ground for making the arrest."'27  Similarly, in Steagald v.
United States, 28 the Court observed that "[t]he common law may, within
limits, be instructive in determining what sorts of searches the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment regarded as reasonable." 129 In holding that a search
warrant was required before the police could enter the home of one person in
order to search for another person for whom they had an arrest warrant,
130
order to make a routine felony arrest." Id at 576. The majority stated that "[t]he
common-law understanding of an officer's authority to arrest sheds light on the
obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive, consideration of what the Framer's of
the [Fourth] Amendment might have thought to be reasonable." Id. at 591. The
majority concluded that "the issue is not one that can be said to have been definitively
settled by the common law at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted." Id at
598.
Justice White, writing for the dissent, agreed that "the common law of searches
and seizures ... is highly relevant to the present scope of the Fourth Amendment."
Id at 604 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also mentioned that "the background,
text, and legislative history of the Fourth Amendment demonstrate that [it] ...
preserved common-law rules of arrest." Id at 611. He concluded that "it was not
considered generally unreasonable at common law for officers to break doors to effect
a warrantless felony arrest" and concluded that "the Fourth Amendment was [not]
intended to outlaw the types of police conduct at issue in the present cases." Id
125. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
126. Id. at 420. See generally Horace A. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant (pt.
1), 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 549-50 (1924).
127. Watson, 423 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added) (citing cases).
128. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
129. Id. at 217.
130. There is strong reason to believe that the common law recognized only
limited authority to search private premises. See Barrett, supra note 67, at 50 (citing
authorities); see also Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 603 (1946) (Frankfurter J.,
dissenting) (referring to the "early English doctrine [that] even search warrants by
appropriate authority could issue only for stolen goods"). However, the common law
granted relatively broad authority to enter private premises, even without a warrant,
to make an arrest. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603-15 (1980) (White, J.,
dissenting) (discussing common law right to arrest); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 306-09 (1958) (same).
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the Court said that "the history of the Fourth Amendment strongly suggests
that its Framers would not have sanctioned the instant search.' 3
1
Other decisions also reflect the impact that the Supreme Court's sense of
historical practices has had on its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."I The
Court has not, however, "simply frozen into constitutional law those law
enforcement practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's
passage,"'3 nor has it adopted what Justice Scalia has termed the "first
principle" of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-the notion that "the
'reasonableness requirement' of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection
that the common law afforded ... includ[ing] the requirement of a war-
rant."'34 Rather, the Court has said that the Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
131. Steagald 451 U.S. at 220. The dissent took the position that warrantless
entries into the home of one person to effect the arrest of another were acceptable at
common law because warrantless entries "into the home of the subject of the arrest
warrant himself' were acceptable. Id. at 230 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 n.14 (1977); United
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 804-05 n.6 (1974) (noting "the established and
routine custom of permitting a jailer to search the person who is being processed for
confinement."); cf. Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1974) (stating
that "the Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth amendment in light of the law that
existed when the Bill of Rights was adopted," but declining to interpret the Fourth
Amendment to prohibit a warrantless misdemeanor arrest, because, inter alia, "[tihe
difference between felonies and misdemeanors is no longer as significant as it was at
common law.").
History has also been said to be relevant in other Constitutional settings. See,
e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
bars the execution of a person while he or she is insane and emphasizing that the
execution of the insane was barred at common law); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260
U.S. 22,31 (1922) (Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to destroy historical state
law practices); Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885) (holding that the constitutional
requirement of indictment for infamous crimes extends to statutory crimes permitting
imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor even though that punishment was
unknown when the Constitution was adopted).
133. Garner, 471 U.S. at 13 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 591 n.33); Steagald,
451 U.S. at 217 n.10 (same).
134. Acevedo, III S. Ct. at 1993 (Scalia, J., concurring); cf Brain v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1887) (the Fourth and Fifth Amendments "contemplated
perpetuating, in their full efficacy.., principles of humanity and civil liberty, which
had been secured in the mother country only after years of struggle."). In a similar
vein, it has been argued that the Confrontation Clause was intended to constitutionalize
the common law hearsay rule. 5 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 155-85
(1902) (Chadboum rev. 1974).
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tion against unreasonable searches and seizures "must be interpreted 'in light
of contemporary norms and conditions."'"35
b. The Felony/Misdemeanor Distinction
The Supreme Court has had difficulty determining how the
felony/misdemeanor distinction relates to the Fourth Amendment. In United
States v. Hensley,36 the Supreme Court found the distinction useful and held
that the police may stop a person on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that
the person "was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed
felony."'37 A few months later, however, in Tennessee v. Garner,' the
Court characterized the felony/misdemeanor distinction as "highly technical,"
"minor," and "arbitrary."'39 The Court observed that many misdemeanors
involve conduct more dangerous than that involved in many felonies, 40 and
rejected the argument that deadly force should be permitted to effect the
seizure of any felon because such seizures were permitted at common law. 4'
Instead, before such force may be used to prevent the escape of a suspect, an
officer must have probable cause to arrest the suspect and "probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the
officer or to others." 142
In a 1974 decision, the Fourth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment
should not "be interpreted to prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors
committed outside an officer's presence."'43 The court reached this result
in significant part because it believed that the felony/misdemeanor distinction
"is no longer as significant as it was at common law."" 4
135. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 217 n.10 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 591 n.33).
136. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
137. Id. at 229. The Hensley Court did not decide that Terry stops for non-
felonies were impermissible. It simply declined to decide whether warrantless "Terry
stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted." Id. at 229.
138. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
139. Id at 14, 20.
140. Id at 14; see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 761 (1984) (White,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that "a bright-line distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors is untenable.").
141. Garner, 471 'U.S. at 8-15. The Court emphasized, however, that the
common law forbade "the use of deadly force to apprehend a misdemeanant,
condemning such action as disproportionately severe." Id at 15.
142. Id. at 11.
143. Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Welsh, 466
U.S. at 756 (White, J., dissenting).
144. Street, 492 F.2d at 372; see also Welsh, 466 U.S. at 761 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("The category of misdemeanors today includes enough serious offenses to
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Despite its flaws, the felony/misdemeanor' 45 distinction should be
accorded constitutional significance. The distinction has deep roots in the
common law'46 and in search and seizure law.'47 It also comports with
call into question" the felony-misdemeanor line); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411,438-40 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that "a felony at common law and
a felony today bear only slight resemblance ... only the most serious crimes were
felonies at common law, and many crimes now classified as felonies.., were treated
as misdemeanors."); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) ("mhe
difference in punishment between felonies and misdemeanors... [u]nder our present
... statutes... is much less important [than at common law]."); FISHER, supra note
4, at 182 ("Under modem conditions and theories of penology a felony is not
necessarily any more heinous or harmful to the public than a misdemeanor.").
145. There is no universal definition of felony. Many jurisdictions look to the
possible sentence. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1988) ("Any offense punishable by
death or by a term exceeding one year is a felony."); ALA. CODE § 13A-1-2(4) (1982)
("an offense for which a sentence.., in excess of one year is authorized"); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-401 (Harrison 1986) ("a crime punishable by death, by imprisonment for
life, or by imprisonment for more than twelve months"); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/5-1-9 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("an offense for which a sentence to death or to a term of
imprisonment in a penitentiary for one year or more is provided"); MICH. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 761.1(g) (West Supp. 1993) ("a violation of a penal law ... for which the
offender... may be punished by death or by imprisonment for more than 1 year, or
an offense expressly designated by law to be a felony"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.016
(1986) ("death or imprisonment ... in excess of one year"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00
(McKinney 1988) ("an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in
excess of one year may be imposed"); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.04.040 (West
1988) ("A crime is a felony if it is so designated... or if persons convicted thereof
may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term in excess of one year."); see also OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.02(E) (Anderson 1993) ("any offense not specifically
classified is a felony if imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed as a
penalty").
In those jurisdictions where the definition of felony depends on the place of
incarceration, the practical definition of felony is often the same as in jurisdictions
which use the one year approach "since state correction codes commonly provide for
imprisonment in the penitentiary if a sentence exceeds one year and for imprisonment
in jail if the sentence is for one year or less." WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.2, at 10 n.3 (2d ed. 1992). See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.08 (West 1992) (defining felony as an offense punishable by death or
imprisonment in the state penitentiary and further stating that "[a] person shall be
imprisoned in the state penitentiary for each sentence which ... exceeds one year").
Justice White, who said that the distinction is "untenable," Welsh, 466 U.S. at
761, also observed that felonies can fairly be said to be "the most serious crimes." See
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 616-17 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
146. At common law, there were three categories of crime: treason, felonies, and
misdemeanors. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN H. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6, at 30
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contemporary norms. The felony/misdemeanor distinction has been said to be
"[t]he most important classification of crimes in general use in the United
States."'48 The applicability of many rules of criminal procedure outside the
Fourth Amendment setting "depend[s] upon whether the crime in question is
a felony or a misdemeanor." 49 In some jurisdictions, pretrial procedures
such as discovery, 5' indictments,' preliminary hearings,"5 2  and
others' are required only if the charged crime is a felony. Whether a
n.1 (2d ed. 1986). Felonies were defined as crimes that resulted in "a total forfeiture
of the offender's lands, or goods, or both," upon conviction. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115
U.S. 487, 499 (1885); see also Garner, 471 U.S. at 13 n.ll. The term misdemeanor
was applied to "all offenses other than treason or felony." ROLLIN M. PERKINS &
RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 15 (3d ed. 1991).
147. See, e.g., Watson, 423 U.S. at 418-20 (discussing common law distinction);
Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-15 (same); Payton, 445 U.S. at 573; Barrett, supra note 67,
at 71 ("For felonies an officer may break, upon Process, and oath-i.e. by a special
Warrant to Search Such House .... ") (quoting QumNcY'S MASS. REP. 471 (1765)
(speech of James Otis)); 2 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS TO THE CROWN,
ch. 14 § 1 at 136 (8th ed. 1824) (suggesting that the hot pursuit doctrine was limited
to felons or other serious offenders).
148. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 146, at 30; cf Horace A. Wilgus, Arrest
Without a Warrant (pt. 1), 22 MICH. L. REv. 541, 569-70 (1924) (discussing the
differences between felonies and misdemeanors in England).
149. LAFAVE & SCoTr, supra note 146, at 31. A felony offender may also be
subject to extended imprisonment under habitual felony offender laws. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-5-9 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 1992).
150. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86 (West 1985) (depositions of
witnesses permissible only in felony cases); People v. Khan, 483 N.E.2d 1030, 1035
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985) ("Illinois Supreme Court rules regarding discovery are not
applicable in misdemeanor cases.").
151. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (grand jury is unnecessary in misdemeanor cases);
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 7 (indictment or information is required for all felony prosecu-
tions); 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/111-2 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("(a) All prosecution
of felonies shall be by information or by indictment... (b) All other prosecutions
may be by indictment, information or complaint."); see also State v. Hollis, 750
S.W.2d 674, 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (the same strictness in charging is not required
for misdemeanors as for felonies).
152. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b) (mandating special rules for the initial
appearance if the defendant is charged with "a misdemeanor... triable by a United
States magistrate."); ALA. CODE § 15-11-1 (1982); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/109-
3.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (mandating special procedures for preliminary hearings in
felony cases); MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-304 (1989); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 135.070 (1991) (if defendant is charged with a felony, the magistrate must read the
information and inform the defendant of his rights before the preliminary hearing).
153. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-12-3 (1986) (no right to a jury trial in
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defendant is charged with a felony or a misdemeanor may also affect the
proceedings during trial 4 and may determine the court in which the offense
is tried.'
The felony/misdemeanor distinction is important in substantive criminal
law. In many jurisdictions, certain acts are criminal only if engaged in by
convicted felons' or if done in order to commit a felony' or to harbor
or conceal a felon.' Conversely, homicide may be justifiable if done to
resist a felony, but not otherwise. 9
misdemeanor cases tried in district court); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 10-43-102 (Michie
1987) (permitting the arrest of material witnesses in felony cases); 725 ILL. COMp.
STAT. ANN. 5/103-1(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("No person arrested for a traffic,
regulatory or misdemeanor offense, except in cases involving weapons or a controlled
substance, shall be strip searched .... "); NEV. REV. STAT. § 173.175 (1991) (if
indictment or information is for a felony, bail must be increased); id. § 178.484 (1991)
(if a person is arrested for a felony, the court may require surrender of passport before
pretrial release).
154. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-16-21 (1982); Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 27 (1993)
(mandating different trial procedures for misdemeanors and felonies); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2001 (1989) (misdemeanant, but not felon, may be tried in absentia); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 175.141 (1991) (if indictment or information is for a felony, the clerk must
read it and state the defendant's plea to the jury).
155. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I. § 8 ("Laws may be enacted providing for the
trial of offenses not felonious by a court not of record without a jury .... "); ALA.
CODE § 12-11-30 (1986) (circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
felony prosecutions); id. § 12-12-32 (1986) (district court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over misdemeanors); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24A.110 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1992).
156. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1988) (unlawful for convicted felon
to possess a firearm); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23 (West 1992) (same); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 202.360 (1991) (same).
157. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/19-1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("A
person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters.., a building
... with intent to commit therein a felony or theft."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-203
(1993) (crime to solicit a person to commit an act which is a felony); see also LaFave
& Scott, supra note 146, § 7.5 (discussing the felony-murder doctrine).
158. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 32 (West 1988) (defining "accessories" as
those who harbor, conceal, or aid a felon); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 274, § 4 (West
1990) (same); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-1-5 (1972) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-4
(Michie Supp. 1984) (same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.47 (West 1982) (harbors or aids
a felon with the intent to prevent apprehension).
159. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-607 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 197 (West 1988); IDAHO CODE § 184009 (1987); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-15
(1972); see also 720 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/7-2 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (use of force
in defense of a dwelling is justified if "(b) necessary to prevent the commission of a
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The felony/misdemeanor distinction is important outside the criminal law.
Some states have recognized conviction of a felony as a ground for di-
vorce.'60 Convicted felons are often subject to disbarment and the loss of
other professional licenses,"' and are sometimes rendered ineligible to
vote,6 serve on juries,6 or hold public office." Some states require
convicted felons to register their presence in the jurisdiction.'65
In his Watson dissent, Justice Marshall suggested that because felonies at
common law and felonies today bear only a slight resemblance to one another,
the common law felony/misdemeanor distinction is largely irrelevant to
"modem interpretation of our Constitution."'" In Marshall's view, adoption
of the common law rule would mean that an arrest warrant would be required
only if a crime was a misdemeanor at common law. 67
In fact, reliance on the felony/misdemeanor distinction should not
inevitably result in a rule that an arrest warrant is required only if a crime was
felony in the dwelling.").
160. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.050 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 32-603 (1983);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/401(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("convict[ion] of a felony
or other infamous crime"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-03 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 25-4-2 (1992); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.04 (West 1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-91 (Michie 1992).
161. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 12273 (West 1992) (public accountants
certificate may be suspended or revoked upon "[c]onviction of a felony"); N.Y. JuD.
LAw § 90(4)(a) (McKinney 1983) ("Any... attorney who shall be convicted of a
felony ... shall upon such conviction, cease to be an attorney .... "); OHIO BAR R.
§ 5-(A)(1) (1993) (Any Justice, judge, or attorney convicted of a felony "shall be
subject to an indefinite suspension.").
162. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. III, § 2 (no person shall be deprived of the right
to vote "except for the commission of a felony at common law"); VA. CONST. art. II,
§ 1; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-101 (Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4615
(1988).
163. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (1988) (a person who has a felony charge
pending against him or who has been convicted of a felony in state or federal court is
ineligible to serve on a jury.); ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.020 (1983); ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 21-201 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4615 (1988); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 561.026(3) (1986); UTAH CODE § 78-46-7 (1993).
164. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-904 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4615 (1988); Mo. REv. STAT. § 561.021.1(1), (2) (1986); see also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-1-105(3) (1986) ("Every person convicted of a felony.., shall be disqualified
from holding any office of honor .... ").
165. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.13 (West 1992); see also ALA. CODE
§ 13A-11-181 (1982) (a person convicted of two or more felonies must register with
the sheriff in his or her county of residence).
166. Watson, 423 U.S. at 438 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 440-41.
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a misdemeanor at common law. Offenses can be and have been reclassi-
fied,168 even at common law. What is constitutionally important is not
whether a particular crime was a felony or a misdemeanor at common law, but
whether the common law made a distinction between felonies and misdemean-
ors. 169 It is the distinction that the Constitution should be said to recognize,
not the crimes encompassed within the distinction.' Through the use of
that distinction, as Justice Marshall recognized, the common law tempered "the
public need for the most certain and immediate arrest of criminal suspects
with the requirement of magisterial oversight to protect against mistaken
insults to privacy [and] decreed that only in the most serious of cases could
the warrant be dispensed with."'' That balance should continue to be
reflected in a rule that requires a warrant for most misdemeanor arrests'"
2. Reasonableness and the Balancing of Interests
The Supreme Court has observed that "[w]hat is reasonable depends upon
all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure."'73 A determina-
tion of reasonableness requires that courts "consider the scope of the particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating
it, and the place in which it is conducted."'74  This must be balanced
"against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
168. See, e.g., Watson, 423 U.S. at 440-41 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Burroughs v. Eastman, 59 N.W. 817, 819-20 (Mich. 1894); see also Garner, 471 U.S.
at 14 (observing that "[m]any crimes classified as misdemeanors, or nonexistent, at
common law are now felonies."); FISHER, supra note 4, at 182 ("The dividing line
between the two is nebulous at best.").
169. An analogy might be found in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
In California v. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991), the Court observed that "Katz
stands for ... the proposition that items which could not be subject to seizure at
common law (e.g., telephone conversations) can be seized under the Fourth
Amendment. That is quite different from saying that what constitutes an arrest (a
seizure of the person) has changed." Id. at 1551 n.3.
170. But see Wilgus, supra note 148, at 569 (suggesting that in England "'felony'
could not be defined, only felonies enumerated.").
171. Watson, 423 U.S. at 441-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172. Cf Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426-29 (1885). "What punishments
shall be considered as infamous may be affected by the changes of public opinion from
one age to another." Id at 427.
173. United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
174. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
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intrusion."'75 Indeed, the Court has frequently said that "the balancing of
competing interests ... [is] the key principle of the Fourth Amendment." 176
One relevant factor in evaluating the importance of the government's
interest is the nature and seriousness of the crime under investigation.'77 In
175. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696,703 (1983); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,228 (1985) (the test
of reasonableness involves balancing "the nature and quality of the intrusion on
personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
the intrusion"); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (Reasonableness
can only be determined by balancing "the need for the particular search against the
invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of
the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for
initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.").
176. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700
n.12 (1981)); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979) (White, J.,
concurring).
The Court has recently observed that "regardless of the terminology used, the
precise content of most of the Constitution's civil-liberties guarantees rests upon an
assessment of what accommodation between governmental need and individual
freedom is reasonable." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987).
177. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 309, 321-22
(1972) (implicitly acknowledging that the nature of some kinds of crime renders those
crimes subject to different kinds of treatment for Fourth Amendment purposes);
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 502-04 (1973) (special protections attach where
First Amendment materials are the subject of a search or seizure); Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1965) (same); But cf New York v. P.J. Video Inc., 475 U.S.
868 (1986).
More specifically, a wide range of Fourth Amendment activities directed toward
more serious offenses or motivated by more serious concerns should, in general, be
viewed more sympathetically while activities directed against minor offenses should
be severely restricted. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn, supra note 102, at 138; see
also Folk, supra note 42, at 331 ("The state's interest in solving a crime should be a
function of the seriousness of the crime; so the state's interest in investigating crimes
should decrease as the seriousness of the crime diminishes."). A few cases have
recognized this fact. See, e.g., Gumz v. Morrisette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1406 (7th Cir.
1985) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (noting the notorious difficulties in defining
reasonableness and observing that "[r]easonableness is an open-ended approach ...
[which] calls for an objective balancing of the harms from the arrest or search against
the potential harms to effective law enforcement of delaying the action or not acting
at all. The graver the crime and the more exigent the circumstances, the more the
police can do-whether that means searching on a lesser probability of finding
something, entering a dwelling at night, or tearing a house apart in search of
evidence."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986), overruled by Lester v. City of
Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d
1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the seriousness of the crime under
19931
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Welsh v. Wisconsin,'78 the Court observed that the penalty that attaches to
an offense is the best indication of the government's interest in convicting
people of that offense,'79 and explicitly held that the seriousness of the
offense for which an arrest is being made is "an important factor to be
considered when determining whether any exigency exists" that would justify
a warrantless home arrest. 8° The next year in United States v. Hensley, 8'
a unanimous Court held that the police may stop a person on the basis of a
reasonable suspicion that the person "was involved in or is wanted in
connection with a completed felony."'82 The Hensley Court did not limit
such stops to felonies. Rather, it merely declined to decide whether
warrantless "Terry stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are
permitted.'
83
In Tennessee v. Garner,' the Court held that deadly force may not be
used to arrest a suspect simply because there is probable cause to believe that
she committed a felony.' Instead, before such force may be used to
prevent the escape of a suspect, an officer must have probable cause to arrest
the suspect and "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of
serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others."'1
86
investigation "may affect the judgment of what is reasonable ... police behavior");
State v. Flowers, 441 So. 2d 707, 713 n.1 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 945
(1984) ("Heightened public interest in the case of serious or violent crimes can tip the
scales in favor of the reasonableness of the police conduct."); Silas J. Wasserstrom &
Louis M. Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19,
47 (1988) (observing that a fully rational approach to search and seizure problems
"would allow consideration of degrees of probability and incorporate other consider-
ations as well such as... the seriousness of the crime under investigation"); infra note
99 (citing authorities).
It could also be argued that where minor offenses are concerned, the reduced
consequences to the individual render the intrusion less hostile and hence more readily
justified. Cf SEARCH AND SEIZuRE, supra note 9, § 9.1(d), at 342 (stating, in the
context of stop and frisk theory, that "it may be postulated that less evidence is needed
to meet the probable cause test when the consequences for the individual are less
serious"); see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967); Wright,
supra note 102, at 1136 n.51.
178. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
179. Id. at 754 & n.14.
180. Id. at 753.
181. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
182. Id at 229.
183. Id. at 229.
184. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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In Graham v. Connor,8  the Court held that all claims that a law
enforcement officer used excessive force in effecting a "seizure" should be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard in light of
the facts and circumstances of each case.'88 Reasonableness, said the Court,
must be determined from all the facts and circumstances, "including the
severity of the crime at issue."'
189
Numerous cases in state courts"9 and in lower federal courts'.' have
187. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
188. Id at 395.
189. Id. at 396; see also George E. Dix, Means of Executing Searches and
Seizures as Fourth Amendment Issues, 67 MINN. L. REV. 89 (1982).
It has been suggested that Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), implicitly
recognized that the seriousness of the offense is relevant to reasonableness analysis.
See Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn, supra note 102, at 138. In Winston, the Court
held that in the absence of a "compelling need" a defendant could not be subject to
surgery in order to retrieve a bullet which was lodged inside him and which there was
probable cause to believe would be useful evidence against him. Winston, 470 U.S.
at 766. The Court said that the police "plainly had probable cause to ... search" and
observed that ajudge had in fact authorized the search after an adversary hearing. Id
at 763 & n.6. The Court did not expressly state that the seriousness of the offense was
a relevant factor in determining reasonableness and did not reach the question of
whether such a search could be compelled absent an adversary hearing. Id However,
Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority observed that the reasonableness of such
intrusions "depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interests in
privacy and security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the
procedure." Id. at 760.
190. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 578 P.2d 123, 127 (Cal. 1978) (where probable
cause exists to believe that a bodily intrusion will yield relevant evidence, the court
should only issue a warrant if the balance of other factors, including "the seriousness
of the underlying criminal offense," so suggests); People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121,
1140 (Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973) ("the 'gravity of the offense' is
an appropriate factor to take into consideration" in determining whether an emergency
existed that justified the searching officers' decision to forego obtaining a warrant);
State v. Niblock, 631 P.2d 661, 666 (Kan. 1981) ("the seriousness of the alleged
offense" is a relevant factor "in evaluating police conduct in making a warrantless
arrest"); see also People v. Johnson, 93 Cal. Rptr. 534, 537 (Ct. App. 1971) ("the
seriousness of the offense allegedly committed" is relevant to whether police officers
had probable cause to arrest kidnapper described by child's mother); People v. Sanders,
374 N.E.2d 1315, 1317-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (applying factors from Dorman v.
United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970), including the seriousness of the crime,
to invalidate warrantless entry to arrest person suspected of burglary which is not "a
grave offense of violence"); State v. Foster, 237 S.E.2d 589, 592 (S.C. 1977).
191. See, e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Mhe
fact that a multiple murderer is on the loose... may affect the judgment of what is
reasonable.... Probable cause.., describes not a point but a zone, within which the
1993]
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recognized, in various Fourth Amendment contexts, that the seriousness of the
offense under investigation bears on whether a particular Fourth Amendment
activity is reasonable."9  These cases, like Welsh, Garner, Hensley, and
Graham, suggest that the less serious the offense under investigation, the
greater the limits the Constitution imposes on the kind of actions the
government can take to investigate the offense and to seize the offender. 93
Because a determination of reasonableness requires a balancing of
interests, the constitutionality of warrantless arrests on probable cause for
misdemeanors committed outside the officer's presence can be determined
only by looking at the costs and benefits of such a rule.'94 The costs of a
graver the crime the more latitude the police must be allowed."); United States v.
Holland, 510 F.2d 453, 455 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1010 (1975)
(quoting Arnold v. United States, 382 F.2d 4, 7 (9th Cir. 1967)) ("The reasonableness
of... [an] on-the-scene detention is determined by all the circumstances [including]
... [t]he seriousness of the offense."); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that in determining whether exigent circumstances justify a
warrantless entry into a home to make an arrest, one factor to be considered is whether
a grave offense, particularly a crime of violence, is involved); see also United States
v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494, 498 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978)
(following Dorman).
192. The seriousness of the offense is relevant in virtually every area of criminal
procedure. See e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) (adopting a
four factor test, including the seriousness of the offense, for use in weighing speedy
trial claims against delays occasioned by interlocutory appellate review); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (the right to jury trial in state court only applies where
a defendant is charged with a serious offense); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972) (the right to appointed counsel only attaches if the defendant is to be sentenced
to incarceration).
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), the Court
suggested that the magnitude of the harm that a Fourth Amendment activity is intended
to avert is relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. The Court ruled that railroad
employees could be tested for drug use without a warrant and without individualized
suspicion, because the evil against which such efforts were directed was not simply the
violation of criminal laws against the possession of drugs, but the "far more dangerous
wrong" of performing "certain sensitive tasks while under the influence of those
substances." Id. at 633.
193. Cf Note, Search & Seizure in the Supreme Court, Shadows on the Fourth
Amendment, 28 U. CI. L. REV. 664, 677 (1961) ("the detection of minor crimes
might legitimize only minor invasions of privacy.").
194. Cf Steagald, 451 U.S. at 222; see also Note, The Supreme Court, Leading
Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 245 (1985) (Garner suggests that the reasonableness
of seizures should be determined by weighing "the infringement of the individual's
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rule barring warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed outside the
arresting officer's presence are likely to be low. As Justice White observed
in his dissent in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 95 the seriousness of the offense is
clearly relevant to whether "the delay that attends the warrant-issuance process
will endanger officers or other persons. The seriousness of the offense with
which a suspect may be charged also bears on the likelihood that he will flee
and escape apprehension if not arrested immediately."'96 In addition, the
seriousness of the offense affects the likelihood that the suspect might commit
new offenses or destroy evidence while the police are obtaining a warrant.
Minor offenders have less to fear from conviction than serious offenders.
Moreover, the activities of minor offenders are less likely than the activities
of serious offenders to come to the attention of the police and to generate
police interest. For these and other reasons, people who have committed
minor crimes have a reduced incentive to take steps to avoid apprehension and
conviction and are less likely than serious offenders to commit additional
crimes, destroy evidence, resist arrest, flee, or resort to violence in an effort
to escape prosecution.1 97
The costs of a rule barring most warrantless misdemeanor arrests are far
outweighed by the advantages that flow from a warrant requirement. First, the
need to obtain a warrant may cause the police, because of the inconvenience
involved, to refrain altogether from making some arrests. 98 Second, if
195. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
196. Id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting). But cf Garner, 471 U.S. at 14 (characteriz-
ing "the assumption that a 'felon' is more dangerous than a misdemeanant" as
"untenable").
197. See infra notes 271-77 and accompanying text. But cf infra note 289 (citing
authorities).
198. See Bohlen & Shulman, supra note 8, at 490 ("The privilege to arrest
without a warrant will undoubtedly lead to officers taking into custody persons for
offenses which, though actually committed ... are ... deemed too insignificant to
warrant prosecution."); see also Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906,
926-29 (1986).
Although "[t]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not the defeat of certain
criminal laws," id. at 920, "there... are public interests in not incarcerating persons
accused of minor regulatory offenses [who cannot make bail] solely on account of their
indigency and in not exacerbating existing problems of prison overcrowding." State
v. Hurtado, 529 A.2d 1000, 1008 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (Skillman, J.,
dissenting), rev'd on dissent, 549 A.2d 428 (N.J. 1988). The Supreme Court observed
some time ago that "[tihe processing of misdemeanors, in particular, and the early
stages of prosecution generally are marked by delays that can seriously affect the
quality of justice." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 n.23 (1975). Moreover, in
many cases of minor criminality the offender and society might be better off if the
crime had never been detected and the offender never prosecuted. See David A.J.
1993]
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some minor offenders cannot be arrested except pursuant to a warrant, high
speed vehicle pursuits and other dangerous activities directed toward the
immediate apprehension of such offenders will be pointless, and therefore
discouraged.' Third, a warrant requirement insures that inferences of
criminality will "be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime."" ° Magistrate review should reduce the incidence of
unjustified arrests."1 Fourth, a warrant requirement prevents "hindsight
from affecting the evaluation of the reasonableness of "an arrest.2" Because
it compels "a contemporaneous recordation of the factors on whose basis...
action is being taken,"203 a warrant requirement reduces the risk of "post hoc
manipulation of the facts" and the risk that "even if the police are paragons of
virtue," facts will not be accurately recalled or reported months after the
event.2 ' Fifth, if police officers are able to show a warrant before making
an arrest, "the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct," and the risk
Richards, Liberalism, Public Morality, and Constitutional Law: Prolegomenon to a
Theory of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 143
(1988) (noting that many laws creating victimless crimes "may be subject to cogent
criticism on the ground that they cause more social evil and injustice than they
remedy.").
199. See, e.g., State v. Blake, 468 N.E.2d 548, 549-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); State
v. Koziol, 338 N.W.2d 47, 47-48 (Minn. 1983).
200. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
201. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 n.4, 602 n.55 (1980). Even
those who view the warrant requirement as largely meaningless concede that
"magistrates screen out at least a few searches." Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note
177, at 34. But cf William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77
VA. L. REv. 881, 893 (1991) ("while requiring warrants ... reduce[s] the odds of
police mistake in applying the relevant legal standards, it ... creates additional
opportunities for error by magistrates.... Requiring warrants therefore may lead to
more bad searches than would a simple system of police decisionmaking followed by
after-the-fact review.").
202. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Harris, supra note 112, at 62.
203. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRUST 172-73 (1981); see also YALE
KAMISER, WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND JEROLD H. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 213 (7th ed. 1990) (asking rhetorically whether arrest warrants can be
justified "on the ground that, at least the police must make a record before the event
of the basis for their actions?")
204. Wayne R. LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth, On Allen's "Process of
'Factualization' in the Search and Seizure Cases," 85 Mich. L. Rev. 427, 459 (1986);
see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (An "after-the-event justification for the
arrest ... [is] too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of
hindsight judgment."); Stuntz, supra note 201, at 893.
[Vol. 58
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of resistance, is reduced by the assurances implicitly given to the individual
being arrested "of the lawful authority of the ... officer.., and the limits of
his power."'2 5 Sixth, because of the Court's preference for warrants, some
arrests that might be invalidated if conducted without a warrant might be
upheld if conducted pursuant to a warrant.206 Other arrests will be upheld
because of the deference given the magistrate's judgment by reviewing
courts.0 7 Seventh, the good faith exception announced in United States v.
Leon,208 suggests that some activities conducted pursuant to a warrant will
be upheld while similar activities will be invalidated if conducted without a
warrant.2' Eighth, officers making an arrest pursuant to a warrant are, in
most cases, immune from civil liability for their actions even if the warrant
turns out to be invalid.210 Ninth, a warrant requirement for most misde-
meanor arrests is likely to enhance respect for the law. Few people are likely
to object to warrantless arrests of murderers and other serious offenders.
Many people, however, might be offended by warrantless arrests of gamblers,
trespassers, speeders, and other minor offenders.21' Tenth, pretext arrests
205. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989); City of Middlesburg Heights v. Theiss, 501
N.E.2d 1226 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (assuming that warrantless entry to arrest for
disorderly conduct was unlawful but upholding convictions of occupants for assault and
resisting arrest).
206. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 n.10 (quoting in part from United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)); see also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
270 (1960) (suggesting that where a warrant is obtained reviewing courts should accept
evidence of a less 'judicially... persuasive character than would have justified an
officer in acting on his own without a warrant."); United States v. Alvarez, 810 F.2d
879, 883 (9th Cir. 1987) (observing that in FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2) Congress "has
stated its strong preference for the use of warrants" and stating that "when warrants are
used, a defendant's ability to challenge a search or seizure is severely limited.").
207. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (quoting Jones, 362 U.S. at 271)) ("[T]he
duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial
basis for ... conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed.").
208. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
209. See Dripps, supra note 198, at 944-47 (discussing whether the good faith
exception announced in Leon extends to warrantless activities).
210. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644-45 (1987); see also United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n. 32 (1982) (officers acting pursuant to a warrant
gain "the protection that a warrant would provide to them in an action for damages
brought by an individual claiming that the" police acted unconstitutionally).
211. See Folk, supra note 42, at 334 (observing that "[lo the extent that the
community views a custodial arrest with its accompanying stigma and inconvenience
as disproportionate to the underlying offense, the arrest creates disrespect for the
law."). See also Gordon B. Baldwin, Welsh v. Wisconsin-A View From Counsel, 68
1993]
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should present few problems if the law imposes a more demanding warrant
requirement when the offense under investigation is less serious. The pretext
problem almost always arises in the context of police officers arresting a
suspect for a minor crime in order to investigate that suspect for some more
serious offense.1 2 Only on very rare occasions are police officers likely to
make a warrantless arrest for a felony when their real purpose is to investigate
a lesser offense.213
An examination of the costs and benefits of a rule that bars warrantless
arrests for misdemeanors committed outside the officer's presence suggests
that such a rule is required by the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
MARQ. L. REv. 623, 645 (1985) (suggesting that if, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Court
had upheld warrantless home arrests for minor offenses, many observers would have
been outraged).
212. Over fifty years ago the Supreme Court held that "[ain arrest may not be
used as a pretext to search for evidence." United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,
467 (1932); see also Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 593 (D. Minn. 1973)
(citing cases); People v. Flanagan, 391 N.Y.S.2d 907 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
Similarly, some courts have held that a valid arrest for a minor crime cannot be used
as a pretext to interrogate a suspect about some other crime. United States v. Causey,
818 F.2d 354, 358-61, reh'g granted, 822 F.2d 511, rev'd, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.
1987); People v. Griffin, 510 N.E.2d 1311, 1314-15 (IIl. App. Ct. 1987). Other courts,
however, have said that a stop is valid whatever the officers' motives as long as there
was a legal basis for that stop. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210,
212-15 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987), and superseded by statute as
stated in United States v. Dombrowski, 877 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Salken,
supra note 41 at 237-38 rm.121-127 (citing cases). More recently, the Supreme Court,
in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 141 (1978), appeared to reject the relevance
of the officer's motive in Fourth Amendment situations.
Professor Burkoff has written extensively on the pretext problem. See, e.g., John
M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving, 66 U. DET. L.
REV. 363 (1989); John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine, Now You See It, Now
You Don't, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 523 (1984); John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 114 (1982).
Misuse of the power to arrest would occur less frequently if custodial arrests for
traffic and other minor offenses were constitutionally impermissible. See generally
Salken, supra note 41; see also Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication,"
versus "Standardized Procedures," The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127,
141-42.
213. See ARREST, supra note 9, at 30; cf Payton, 445 U.S. at 618 (White, J.,
dissenting) (it is unlikely that police would use the power to make warrantless entries
to arrest "as a pretext to justify an otherwise invalid warrantless search."). Still rarer
will be the occasions on which a prosecutor will overcharge in order to save a case.
See Yale Kamisar, 'Comparative Reprehensibility' and the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule,' 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1987).
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requirement and more broadly by "the balancing of competing interests 21 4
that is at the core of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has said
that it is reasonable for a police officer to unilaterally decide to subject a
person to the severe consequences of arrest for a serious crime-a felony.
There the public interest in apprehending the offender is great. Misdemean-
ors, however, are relatively less important than felonies. It is therefore
appropriate that additional safeguards be imposed and hurdles leaped before
an individual can be subjected to the indignity and inconvenience of an arrest
for a misdemeanor. 5
Courts have held that strip searches of persons detained for minor
offenses are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.2 6  Given the
214. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 700 n.12).
215. See People v. Hughes, 49 Cal. Rptr. 767,771 (Ct. App. 1966) ("Traditional-
ly, the law has imposed on the police a more restricted field of action where mere
misdemeanors were involved than where felonious conduct was sought to be prevented
or punished."); People v. Strelow, 292 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
("Preventing the escape of a fleeing felon may necessarily prevail over the interests the
statute [requiring knocking before entering] was designed to protect. Employing the
same balancing test, the less serious nature of a misdemeanor offense militates against
extending the hot pursuit exception to justify unannounced entry" into a private
residence); Hastings, supra note 5, at 60 ("Since there is a natural tendency for society
to demand less protection for the person who causes the greatest harm, the powers of
arrest for a felony are invariably broader than those governing arrest for a misdemean-
or.").
216. See e.g., Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir.
1983) ("[HIere, the strip searches bore an insubstantial relationship to security needs
so that, when balanced against plaintiffs-appellees' privacy interests, the searches
cannot be considered 'reasonable'."); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. deniedsub. nom., Clements v. Logan, 455 U.S. 942 (1982) (strip search
of jailed DWI suspect was unreasonable and unconstitutional because it "bore no
discernible relationship to security needs ... when balanced against the ultimate
invasion of personal rights involved"); see also Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393-95
(10th Cir. 1984) (following Logan and holding that the Fourth Amendment was
violated by strip search of driver who was arrested on an apparently outstanding bench
warrant-which had in fact been withdrawn-relating to a speeding ticket); cf United
States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that the use of
highly intrusive techniques such as television surveillance inside a house should be
barred where minor offenses are involved). But cf Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
558-60 (1979) (upholding practice of strip searching Federal prison inmates after every
contact visit with a person from outside the institution).
Many jurisdictions now bar strip searches for minor offenses. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-3-405 (1990) ("No person arrested for a traffic or a petty offense
shall be strip searched .... "); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-1(c) (Smith-Hurd
1993) ("No person arrested for a traffic, regulatory or misdemeanor offense, except in
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profound impact of an arrest on an arrestee, and the state's relatively minor
interest in any particular misdemeanor arrest,2" 7 it may also be unreasonable,
absent an actual breach of the peace occurring in the presence of the officer,
for a police officer not to obtain a warrant before arresting a person suspected
of a misdemeanor. 18
Ultimately, as with any balancing test, it is possible only to identify the
factors to be balanced. The weight assigned to any particular factor depends
on the value system of the person doing the weighing. Current practice,
however, also suggests that the Constitution mandates some aspects of the
common law rule governing warrantless misdemeanor arrests.
3. Reasonableness and Current Practices Among the States
In United States v. Watson,21' the Supreme Court, in the course of
holding that a warrantless public felony arrest on probable cause was
permissible, observed that "almost all the States" authorized felony arrests on
probable cause but without a warrant."20 In Garner v. Tennessee," the
Court observed that in "evaluating the reasonableness of police procedure
under the Fourth Amendment, we have also looked to prevailing rules in
individual jurisdictions."' Other decisions have also suggested that current
practices among the states can provide some indication of what is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.' Given the diversity of views in the states
cases involving weapons or a controlled substance, shall be stripped searched .....
217. Maclin, supra note 88, at 767.
218. See State v. Hurtado, 529 A.2d 1000, 1008 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)
(Skillman, J., dissenting), rev'd on dissent, 549 A.2d 428 (N.J. 1988) ("[S]ome
offenses ... do not pose a sufficiently grave threat to the public welfare to warrant
even the temporary detention of an alleged offender pending the posting of bail."); cf
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
219. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
220. Id. at 422.
221. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
222. Id. at 15-16.
223. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). The Court has also
looked to the practices of the states in other areas. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 789-92 (1982) (reviewing state laws and observing that "only a small
minority ofjurisdictions-eight-allow the death penalty to be imposed solely because
the defendant ... participated in a robbery in the course of which a murder was
committed"); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (referring to the near uniform
judgment of the nation as a reason to hold unconstitutional a provision that misde-
meanors could be tried to the jury of six, five of whom must concur); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594-96 (1977).
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regarding warrantless misdemeanor arrests, current practice provides only
limited guidance. Currently, most states allow police to make warrantless
arrests on probable cause for misdemeanors committed in the arresting
officer's presence. In addition, most states permit warrantless misdemeanor
arrests under certain exigent circumstances, variously defined, 4 and for
certain specific offenses, such as domestic abuse, driving while intoxicated,
theft, and assault.' Only a small minority of states permit warrantless
misdemeanor arrests on the same terms as felony arrests. 6
In Garner, the Court found a "long-term movement ... away from the
rule that deadly force may be used against any fleeing felon."' 7 There has
been similar long-term movement away from the breach of the peace
requirement. In Garner, however, the trend was toward greater protection for
the individual. Here, the trend has been toward less protection for the
individual, and consequently, may have less constitutional significance than
did the trend acknowledged in Garner.
The long-standing existence of a statute or practice does not immunize
that practice from constitutional attack. 8  Nevertheless, "when the
constitutional standard is as amorphous as the word 'reasonable'... custom
and contemporary norms necessarily play such a large role in the constitution-
al analysis." 9 Legislative action certainly provides some indication of what
a community views as reasonable."0
Given the widespread acceptance of the notion that warrantless misde-
meanor arrests are justified under some circumstances, a fair compromise
could be found in the rule contained in the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure which authorizes an arrest without a warrant if the officer has:
224. See, e.g., supra notes 12 & 15 (citing statutes).
225. See, e.g., supra notes 13, 16, 21, & 22 (citing statutes).
226. See, e.g., supra note 18 (citing statutes).
227. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 18 (1985).
228. See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970); see also Watson, 423
U.S. at 430 (Powell, J., concurring).
229. Payton, 445 U.S. at 600.
230. See, e.g., Watson, 423 U.S. at 416 ("Because there is a 'strong presumption
of constitutionality due to an act of Congress, especially when it turns on what is
'reasonable," '[o]bviously the Court should lie reluctant to decide that a search thus
authorized by Congress was unreasonable' .. . .") (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581, 585 (1948)); see also Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals
on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 529, 566 (1978)
(observing that public evaluation of government action influences judicial evaluation
of Fourth Amendment reasonableness); cf Wasserstrom, supra note 41, at 303 n.226.
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reasonable cause to believe that... [a] person has commit-
ted
(a) a felony;
(b) a misdemeanor, and the officer has reasonable cause to
believe that such person
(i) will not be apprehended unless immediately
arrested; or
(ii) may cause injury to himself or others or
damage to property unless immediately arrested; or
(c) a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor in the officer's
presence.31
The rule contained in the Model Code merely adds two exigent
circumstances"2 to the in-the-presence requirement.1 3  It may also be
necessary to recognize other exigencies. For example, the possibility of
escape, 4 the failure of a person to identify himself, 5 and the need to
preserve evidence might well be reasons that justify proceeding without a
warrant. Although the creation of more exceptions might make it more
difficult for police officers and courts to follow the law, 6 those difficulties
231. ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 72, at § 120.1.
232. An exception for situations where the offense was committed out of the
officer's presence and the offender could not "be apprehended unless immediately
arrested," was proposed in 1936 as part of the Uniform Arrest Act § 6(1)B (1936).
See Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 345 (1942). At
first glance such an exception makes sense. A "pedestrian on the street and ... [a]
car on the highway will not obligingly preserve their status quo." United States v.
Kansco, 252 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1958). Nonetheless, the exception seems
questionable. Permitting instant pursuit of minor offenders risks high speed
automobile chases and possible death or injury. State v. Harding, 508 A.2d 471, 476
(Me. 1986) (Violette, J. dissenting).
233. Justice Marshall has expressed the view that the "in the presence" exception
for warrantless misdemeanor arrests "was essentially a narrowly drawn exigent-
circumstances exception." Watson, 423 U.S. at 440 n.8 (citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925)).
234. See ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 72, at § 120.1, Commentary at 290
(observing that "[i]n a number of jurisdictions, the possibility of escape justifies
dispensing with the in-presence requirement.").
235. See VT. R. CRIM. P. 3 (Supp. 1993) ("A law enforcement officer may arrest
without a warrant a person whom the officer has probable cause to believe has
committed a crime in the presence of the officer... (3) When the officer has probable
cause to believe that a person has committed a misdemeanor and the person has
refused to identify himself or herself. ...").
236. Cf Watson, 423 U.S. at 423-24 (choosing not "to encumber criminal
prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circum-
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should be minimal given the extensive experience both have had with exigent
circumstances in the warrantless home entry setting."7
C. The Warrant Clause
1. Generally
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has indicated that it prefers
that searches and seizures be conducted pursuant to a warrant. z 8 The Court
has said that the requirement of a warrant as a precondition to arrest ensures
that inferences of criminality will "be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 9  In this way, a proper
balance will be struck between privacy and public need,24 and "the
individual's legitimate expectation of privacy [is protected] against the
overzealous police officer."24' Arrest warrants are designed to reduce "the
dangers- of unlimited and unreasonable arrests of persons who are not at the
moment committing any crime." '242
stances").
237. See generally William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the
Offense into Fourth Amendment Equations- Warrantless Entries Into Premises, The
Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 439 (1990).
238. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984); Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730,735 (1983) ("Our cases hold that procedure by way of a warrant
is preferred"); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (observing that "the Court
has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible."); United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07, 109 (1965).
239. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), quoted with approval in
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 n.10 (1984); see also Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) ("A warrant ... provides the
detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective determination
whether an intrusion is justified .... ).
240. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978) (the warrant
requirement struck the balance between privacy and public need and "the preconditions
for a warrant; probable cause, specificity ... and overall reasonableness, should afford
sufficient protection."); see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967)
("The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private
property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest.").
241. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (a warrantless arrest
"bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable
cause.").
242. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948).
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The warrant requirement has been said to serve three other purposes.
First, it "prevent[s] hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonable-
ness of a search or seizure." 43 Second, it "greatly reduces the perception
of unlawful or intrusive police conduct," and perhaps the risk of resistance or
violence, "by assuring 'the individual whose property is searched or seized of
the lawful authority of the... officer, his need to [act]... and the limits of
his power .... ,,' Third, it limits the scope of the intrusion.245
The Supreme Court continues to profess fidelity to the warrant require-
ment,2' and has sometimes said that a warrant should be obtained whenever
practicable.247 The Court has recognized, however, that even though
243. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976); Opperman, 428
U.S. at 383 (Powell, J., concurring); Harris, supra note 112, at 62 ("requiring the
police to commit themselves to a theory of probable cause prior to the search lessens
the risk that they will search first and then invent a basis for probable cause afterwards
depending on what was discovered.").
244. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (quoting in part United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22 ("An essential
purpose of the warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens
subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts
of government agents. A warrant assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized
by law .... ).
245. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
246. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991) (holding that
police may conduct a warrantless search of "an automobile and containers within it
where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained" therein
but stating that "[i]t remains a cardinal principle that 'searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are perse unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions"') (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978), and
quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619
("Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in ... a [criminal]
case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued
upon probable cause."); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (holding
that it is not constitutionally unreasonable to secure "a dwelling, on the basis of
probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search
warrant is being sought" but "reaffirm[ing] ... that, absent exigent circumstances, a
warrantless search ... is illegal.").
247. See, e.g., Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113 n.12 (quoting United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (observing that "[i]n terms that apply
equally to arrests, we described the 'very heart of the Fourth Amendment directive'
as a requirement that 'where practical, a governmental search and seizure should"' be
pursuant to a warrant); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Beck, 379 U.S. at 96.
It has been said that "the supposed 'general rule' that a warrant is always
required does not appear to have any basis in the common law." Acevedo, 111 S.Ct.
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"[m]aximum protection of individual rights could be assured by requiring a
magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to any arrest," such a
requirement would impose "an intolerable handicap for legitimate law
enforcement,"48 and over the years, the warrant requirement has become
riddled with exceptions.249
2. Reasons for Dispensing with Warrants
The Supreme Court has articulated several broad justifications for
dispensing with the warrant requirement when ordinary, law enforcement
motivated, Fourth Amendment activities are involved." First, the warrant
requirement has been deemed inapplicable when, because exigent circumstanc-
es are present, "'the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the [Fourth Amendment activity]."''
Second, the warrant requirement has been deemed inapplicable when there is
a reduced expectation of privacy in a particular place to be searched or in a
at-1993 (Scalia, J., concurring).
248. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113.
249. See Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1992 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that "the
'warrant requirement' had become so riddled with exceptions that it was basically
unrecognizable. In 1985, one commentator cataloged nearly 20 such exceptions")
(citing Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv.
1468, 1473-74 (1985)); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735-36 (1983)
(plurality opinion) (listing ten exceptions to the warrant requirement); Robert M.
Bloom, The Supreme Court and Its Purported Preference for Search Warrants, 50
TENN. L. REv. 231, 235, 259 (1983) (arguing that the Court's stated preference for a
search warrant has become largely meaningless except with respect to searches of
homes, offices, and private communications); LaFave, Being FrankAbout the Fourth,
supra note 204, at 460 ("[lit is fair to say that warrantless searches and seizures are
the norm and that resort to the warrant process is the exception."). But cf Welsh, 466
U.S. at 749-50 (stating that "decisions of this Court ... have emphasized that
exceptions to the warrant requirement are 'few in number and carefully delineated."'
(quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972)).
250. The Court has also permitted exceptions "when 'special needs', beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
873 (1987), and quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun,
J., concurring)).
251. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 533); T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 340 (same); see also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
315 (1972); SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 4.1(a), at 119 (referring to this as
"the so-called emergency doctrine.").
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thing to be seized. 2 Third, the Court has consistently viewed certain police
intrusions as more serious than others and has held that "the warrant process
is necessary only for the more serious ones."253 Fourth, the Court has held
that in some cases the need for a clear-cut or bright-line rule outweighs the
arguments for a warrant.' Fifth, in United States v. Watson, 255 the
Court declined to transform its preference for a warrant "into a constitutional
rule" barring warrantless public arrests on probable cause "when the judgment
of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize [such] ...
arrests."" 6 Sixth, the Court has held that "no warrant is necessary when
there is little or nothing for the magistrate to decide." '257 Finally, it has been
suggested that the Court's willingness to carve out exceptions to the warrant
requirement is influenced by a desire "not to overburden the warrant-issuing
process.", 8
a. Frustration of Purpose
The purpose of misdemeanor arrests has changed over the years. The
common law permitted warrantless misdemeanor arrests only when a breach
of the peace was committed in the presence of the arresting officer and
immediate arrest was therefore necessary to "protect the people of the
community from acts of violence. 2 59 It was assumed that the public safety
252. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57
(1979); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972); cf
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875 (the supervision of probationers is a "special need" of the state
which permits "a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional
if applied to the public at large").
253. SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 4.1(a), at 121.
254. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. at 1990; Watson, 423 U.S. at 423 (observing that a
contrary rule would "encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with
respect to the existence of exigent circumstances").
255. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
256. Id. at 423. It has been suggested that the rule that a warrant is not required
when a felony arrest is made in a public place is not necessarily inconsistent with the
"whenever practicable" test because the volume of arrests is so great that it would not
be practical to require a warrant for each one. LaFave, BeingFrankAbout the Fourth,
supra note 204, at 472.
257. SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, at § 4.1(a), at 121. See, e.g., Skinner,
489 U.S. at 622 ("[I]n light of the standardized nature of the tests [at issue] and the
minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program, there are
virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.").
258. SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, at § 4.1(a), at 119.
259. FISHER, supra note 4, at 188; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
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did not require the immediate arrest of other misdemeanants. If their
prosecution was deemed desirable a summons or warrant could issue.2" In
contrast, the common law assumed all felons were persons whose arrest was
necessaryto protect the community. As the Supreme Court observed in 1925,
"the reason for arrest without warrant on a reliable report of a felony was
because the public safety and the due apprehension of criminals charged with
heinous offenses required that such arrests should be made at once without a
warrant."
261
The seriousness of the underlying offense is clearly relevant to whether
"the delay that attends the warrant-issuance process will endanger officers or
other persons."'26 When "felonies or crimes involving a threat to public
safety" are concerned, "it is in the public interest that the crime be solved and
the suspect detained as promptly as possible. 263 This is not true, however,
with most misdemeanors.
Today, misdemeanor arrests are made for many reasons." Some, no
doubt, are made to protect the public.265 In most such cases, the need to
protect the public is evident from the commission of a misdemeanor in the
officer's presence involving a breach of the peace. A bar on warrantless
132,157(1925); Commonwealth v. Huffman, 430 N.E.2d 1190, 1191 n.4 (Mass. 1982)
(observing that "[c]ertain crimes observed by officers create their own exigent
circumstances. For example, should an officer observe a murder or other violent
disturbance in progress, exigent circumstances would be apparent."); cf Reardon v.
Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 1987) (burglary in progress is an exigent
circumstance); United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1978) (same); ALI
MODEL CODE, supra note 72, § 120.1, Commentary at 290 n.4.
260. FIsHER, supra note 4, at 189.
261. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 157; see also FISHER, supra note 4, at 188 ("At the time
the arrest powers were being formulated ... [p]ersons charged with felony were
presumed to be desperate characters, likely to do violence to members of the public,
so must be apprehended by any and all means.").
262. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 759 (White, J., dissenting). But cf Garner, 471 U.S. at
14 (characterizing "the assumption that a 'felon' is more dangerous than a misdemean-
ant" as "untenable").
263. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
264. Many arrests for minor offenses are made for purposes other than
prosecution. ARREST, supra note 9, at 437 (discussing arrests made to serve "deterrent,
rehabilitative, or punitive functions... with full intention by the arresting officers that
prosecution shall not follow."). See generally, id at 437-89; see also People v. Lee,
502 N.E.2d 399, 404 (II. App. Ct. 1986) (observing that "arrests may serve an
investigative purpose"); State v. Weist, 730 P.2d 26, 29 (Or. 1986) (observing that a
warrant might issue for purposes other than the investigation of crime.).
265. But cf FISHER, supra note 4, at 188 ("It must be emphasized that this reason
has largely disappeared in modem times.").
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misdemeanor arrests in other cases would not seriously endanger the public
because the public safety is not usually threatened by persons who have
committed misdemeanors in the past and are now going about their lawful
business.
Even when a violent felony is involved, the public safety is less
threatened by a person who committed a past crime but who now is "going
about his lawful business than it is by a suspect who is currently in the
process of violating the law."" s Persons who have committed misdemean-
ors are probably less likely to commit new offenses than are persons who have
committed felonies. If they do commit new offenses, the costs to society are
likely to be low. 67 Of course, some minor offenders will continue to
violate the law until apprehended. A few may cause substantial harm in the
aggregate by their repeated conduct. Other minor offenders may graduate to
more serious offenses. Many minor offenders, however, will simply continue
going about their lawful business until and unless apprehended.
In the course of the last century, arrest has come to be viewed primarily
as a means of making the arrestee available to answer a charge or accusation
against him.26' This view of arrest has led to the expansion of the common
law power to arrest for misdemeanors. There is, however, rarely a need to
arrest misdemeanor suspects quickly. Although other factors besides the
seriousness of the offense are relevant in determining whether there is a need
to apprehend an offender quickly,269 "[t]he seriousness of the offense...
266. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228. The Hensley Court held that a Terry stop is
permissible if the officer making the stop reasonably suspects that the person stopped
is wanted for investigation of a felony, but declined to decide whether warrantless
"Terry stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted." Id. at 229.
In Payton, the dissenters argued that warrantless felony arrests in the home were
not barred by the Fourth Amendment but recognized that "[a]t common law, absent
exigent circumstances, [warrantless] entries to arrest could be made only for felony."
Payton, 445 U.S. at 616 (White, J., dissenting).
267. But cf Garner, 471 U.S. at 14 (observing that "numerous misdemeanors
involve conduct more dangerous than many felonies").
268. See Thomas v. State, 583 So.2d 336, 338 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991), decision
approved by 614 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1993).
269. See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(en banc); see also United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 458-59 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 857 (1987) (acknowledging that the gravity of the offense is an
important factor in determining whether an exigency exists that justifies a warrantless
home entry, but stating that no exigency exists "'simply because there is probable
cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed"') (quoting Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984)); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th
Cir. 1985) (same); State v. Girard, 555 P.2d 445, 447 (Or. 1976) (allowing warrantless
arrest of burglary suspects inside private dwelling despite the presence of two officers
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[clearly] bears on the likelihood that... [an offender] will flee and escape
apprehension if not arrested immediately."...
Minor offenders have less to fear from conviction than serious offenders.
Consequently, minor offenders have less incentive to flee, to resist arrest by
force, or to engage in other activities that endanger police officers or
others."7 For most minor offenders, the costs and risks of serious efforts
to flee or otherwise evade arrest are prohibitive given the minimal likelihood
of apprehension and the minor consequences of conviction.272 Moreover,
there is often little prospect of successful flight. In many misdemeanor cases,
particularly those that occur in the officer's presence, the identity of the
suspect is known or at least strongly suspected.273 Finally, while serious
offenders are generally aware that their activities have generated police
interest, minor offenders sometimes do not even know they have committed
an offense. 4 For all these reasons, it is unlikely that significant numbers
because of the likelihood that the suspects would try to destroy evidence or escape and
observing that the ability of the officers to prevent an escape while they obtained a
warrant was problematical given the wide range of factors involved including "the size
of the house, the number of exits, [and] the proximity of the house to cover").
270. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 759 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
271. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 189 (observing that at common law persons
accused of breaches of the peace were "not considered likely to resort to desperate
measures to escape punishment, as was quite likely to be the case of one who had
conmmitted a felony"); see also SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 6.1(t) at 605,
nn.179-185 (citing cases, all of which appear to have involved felonies, where "prompt
entry to arrest is called for in order to minimize the risk that someone will be injured
or killed.").
272. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 145, § 1.4 at 28 ("the vast majority" of
defendants whose cases started as misdemeanors "will be sentenced to a fine and/or
some form of community service.").
The overwhelming majority of minor offenses are tried in state court. Many of
these are traffic-related and result only in small fines. Even in the federal system,
where more serious offenses are involved, from 1980 through 1986 less than half of
all non-drug, non-violent offenders convicted in federal court received prison
sentences. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS-1988, at 5.26 (1989).
273. See, e.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 743; State v. Koziol, 338 N.W.2d 47,48 (Minn.
1983); State v. Hitch, 23 Ohio Misc. 2d 29, 30 (Clermont County Ct. 1985); see also
Mendelson, supra note 87, at 504 ("it makes no sense to arrest someone for a noisy
muffler where there is reliable identification and reasonable assurance that the ticket
will be obeyed").
274. See, e.g., People v. Strelow, 292 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(stating that "[t]he defendant testified that he was unaware of the speeding viola-
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of minor offenders will flee or escape apprehension if the police must obtain
a warrant before effecting their arrest. 5
Minor offenders are less likely than serious offenders to use the delay
involved in obtaining a warrant to destroy evidence. In many misdemeanor
cases there is no evidence to destroy. 6 In many other misdemeanor cases
all the evidence has long since been gathered. In those few cases in which
evidence remains to be gathered, minor offenders are probably less likely than
serious offenders to be alert to the need to destroy evidence and are less likely
to actually do so. 7
In his concurring opinion in United States v. Watson,278 Justice Powell
suggested that in some cases a warrant requirement for felony arrests would
"severely hamper" law enforcement because the police might want to delay an
arrest while they collect further evidence of the arrestee's guilt. If, however,
they delayed in obtaining a warrant and the need arose to arrest quickly "they
would risk a court decision that the subsequent exigency did not excuse their
275. See David Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland, 5 MD. L. REv. 125,
152 (1941) ("Since misdemeanors are ordinarily not serious, [the] chances that the
misdemeanant will flee before a warrant is obtained are slim."); see also YALE
KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAvE, & JEROLD ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
213 (7th ed. 1990) (speaking in terms of offenders generally and observing that "'the
risk is negligible that the defendant will suddenly flee between the time the police
solve the case and the time which would be required to obtain and serve an arrest
warrant."); SEARCH AND SEIZURE supra note 9, at § 6.1(b), 573 & n.50 (same, noting
that it is unlikely that "prospective arrestees, as a class, pose the same risk of
disappearance as objects believed to be in a moving vehicle"). But cf. Unites States
v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (stating that "[riestraining police action until
after probable cause is obtained.., might•., enable the suspect to flee in the interim
and to remain at large"); infra note 289 (citing authorities).
In appropriate cases escape can be prevented while the police obtain a warrant.
See, e.g., Jones v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 1125, 1131 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Arguably" the police
had the suspect "cornered and need only have secured the premises, perhaps with the
help of back-up officers, while seeking an arrest warrant."); see also McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) (no exigency because, among other reasons,
"[o]fficers were there to apprehend petitioners in case they tried to leave."); State v.
McNeal, 251 S.E.2d 484, 489 (W. Va. 1978) ("Surely four of the five police officers
could have guarded the personal residence while the fifth sought a warrant").
276. See, e.g., People v. Mercurio, 88 Cal. Rptr 750, 751 (Ct. App. 1970) ("A
traffic violation ordinarily involves no tangible property; hence no implement or fruit
of the crime or infraction will be found... [by a] search.").
277. See State v. Lloyd, 606 P.2d 913, 919 (Haw. 1980) ("[Not every suspect
... will attempt to escape or destroy valuable, albeit illicit, merchandise."). In some
cases, the police could take steps to prevent the destruction or loss of evidence. See
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221 (1981).
278. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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failure to get a warrant. '2 9 If the officers procured a warrant as soon as
they had probable cause, argued Powell, a court might later decide "that the
warrant had grown stale by the time it was used."28°
In fact, "the chances of an arrest warrant becoming 'stale' are rather
remote." ' ' Ordinarily, if probable cause to arrest exists, it "will continue
to exist for the indefinite future."2 Moreover, once an arrest warrant is
obtained there is ordinarily no need to execute it immediately.283 Although
the police rarely investigate reports of misdemeanors,2 ' if further investiga-
tion were warranted,285 officers who feared a suspect might suddenly flee or
destroy evidence could first obtain a warrant and then proceed with their
investigation.
The costs of requiring an arrest warrant for misdemeanors committed
outside an officer's presence are likely to be low. If a person is outside an
officer's presence, arrest, even without a warrant, takes some time. The delay
required to obtain a warrant rarely will add significant time or make it more
difficult to apprehend and prosecute a person who committed a misdemeanor
outside the arresting officer's presence. Moreover, most minor crimes go
unreported. Even when minor crimes are brought to the attention of the
police, they are unlikely to have the time or inclination to investigate
them.286 As a result, "[i]n practice the usual misdemeanor arrest takes place
279. Id. at 431 (Powell, J., concurring).
280. Id. at 431-32.
281. SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 5.1(b) at 402; see also Watson, 423
U.S. at 451 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
282. Watson, 423 U.S. at 449 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Probable cause to search,
in contrast, exists at a particular point in time. SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9,
§ 3.1(b) at 546, § 3.7 at 75. Consequently a search warrant can easily become stale.
Id. § 3.7(a) at 75-88.
283. Watson, 423 U.S. at 451 n.16 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also FED. R.
CraM. P. 4; f FED. R. Cim. P. 41(c) (search warrant is good for 10 days).
284. Police disinterest stems in part from the fact that witnesses to, and victims
of, misdemeanors often lose interest in prosecution or repudiate their complaints. See
Kauffman, supra note 275, at 152-53.
285. See Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 440 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting
that in some cases "[tihe police may discover, to their dismay, that when they do not
conduct an investigation, they cannot get a conviction.").
286. See supra note 284. In 1987 less than 20% of property crimes known to the
police were cleared by arrest. UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, at 510, Table 4.18 (1988). Often, the police make a
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when the officer sees a person commit an act constituting a misdemean-
or."
28 7
The costs of requiring a warrant to arrest for all misdemeanors that do
not involve a breach of the peace, even those committed in an officer's
presence, would be somewhat higher. For one thing, when an offense occurs
in a police officer's presence and that officer is powerless to make an arrest,
the officer's inaction may generate disrespect for the law and lead to low
morale among law enforcement officers. Moreover, the broader the warrant
requirement imposed, the more likely it is that some convictions will be lost
because a warrant will not be sought or, if sought, will not be issued.28 A
few other convictions will be lost because suspects will flee, destroy evidence,
or do other things that preclude their apprehension or conviction during the
time consumed in obtaining a warrant. 9 As the Supreme Court recently
observed, however, "there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitu-
tion sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the
privacy of all of us.",z' Moreover, the minor nature of the offense suggests
that the cost to society of lost convictions for that offense will be low.
29
'
A warrant requirement is likely to result in far more lost arrests than lost
convictions. A warrant requirement reduces the likelihood that the police will
make pretext arrests, use arrests as a harassment tactic, or make unfounded or
ill-advised arrests, or make other kinds of arrests that are not likely to result
287. ARREST, supra note 9, at 236.
288. See Bohlen & Shulman, supra note 8, at 490.
289. In 1969, one author argued that "[w]ith the existent speed and availability
of transportation, criminals can quickly leave the scene, of the crime .... The
presence requirement thus shackles police efficiency." Roach, supra note 8, at 126-27;
see also FISHER, supra note 4, at 183. But cf supra note 275 (citing authorities). It
is the out-of-town offender, who cannot know what "conduct contravenes some
regulation which the wisdom of the local Solons deems necessary," who is likely to
suffer the most severe consequences if arrested. Bohlen & Shulman, supra note 8, at
491-92.
290. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
291. See State v. Flowers, 441 So.2d 707, 713 n.1 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 945 (1984) ("The governmental or public interest in the prevention of serious or
violent crimes, and the quick apprehension of those who commit this type of offense
is generally stronger than that which exists when an individual commits, or is
suspected of having committed, a nonviolent or possessory offense."); see also Welsh
v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750-54 (1984); Langford v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 729 P.2d 822, 829 (Cal.), cert. denied sub nom., Gates v. Langdorf,
484 U.S. 824 (1987).
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in conviction.2' Given the profound impact of an arrest on the arrestee, the
loss of a few convictions is a small price to pay for this reduction in arrests.
An arrest warrant requirement for most misdemeanors will have minimal
impact on crime control goals for another reason. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that the illegality of an arrest has no effect on a subsequent
prosecution.2" If an arrest was made on probable cause but without a
warrant and a court finds that a warrant should have been obtained, the only
result will be the suppression of whatever evidence was obtained in the course
of any search conducted incident to the arrest. In the case of most minor
offenses such searches often turn up nothing. Thus, the failure to comply with
a warrant requirement for misdemeanor arrests will rarely affect the outcome
of any prosecution.
b. Reduced Expectations of Privacy
Two Justices who concurred in Watson made references to the distinction
between arrest in a public place and a "warrantless arrest in a private home or
other place where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy."'
Although a person's location is relevant to that person's privacy expectations
if searched,295 a seizure of a person is no less a seizure2 simply because
292. Many arrests for minor offenses are made for purposes other than
prosecution. See generally ARREST, supra note 9 at 437-89. Many other arrests are
not followed by prosecution. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 145, §1.4 at 21-22
& n.4 (noting that 30% to 50% of felony arrests are dropped as a result of pretrial
screening and suggesting that a high percentage ofmisdemeanor cases also are rejected
but observing that "available statitstics ... are quite sparse"). Of course, some
arrestees are tried and found not guilty. See, e.g., Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797
F.2d 432, 434 (7th Cir. 1986).
293. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Exparte Johnson, 167 U.S. 120, 126 (1897) ("[A]
forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when
brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an
offence, and presents no valid objection to his trial in such court"); Cook v. Hart, 146
U.S. 183, 192 (1892) (stating that "this court will not interfere to relieve persons who
have been arrested and taken by violence from the territory of one State to that of
another"); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 705 (1888) (forcible abduction is no
sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction
of the court); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (defendant arrested in Peru and
brought back to the United States). But see United States v. Tuscanino, 500 F.2d 267,
269 (2d Cir. 1974).
294. Watson, 423 U.S. at 432-33 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id at 433
(Stewart, J., concurring).
295. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 247, 351 (1967), quoted with approval in
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Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 90 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also New
York v. Berger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) (owner of commercial premises has an
expectation of privacy therein but it "is less than" he has in his home and "is
particularly attenuated" in closely regulated industries); California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386, 391 (1985) (one's expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle "is significantly less
than that relating to one's home or office"); cf. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469
(1985) (no "reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of the store where the public
was invited to enter and transact business"); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
176-81 (1984) (no legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields).
In some locations a person may have no privacy interest whatever as against a
search of his person. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-58 (1979)
(observing that a person confined in a detention facility certainly has a "diminished"
expectation of privacy and may have none at all).
Intrusions into the human body are governed by special rules. See, e.g., Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1985) (requiring a "compelling need" before surgical
intrusions into the body can be made. "Where the Court has found a lesser expectation
of privacy.., or where the search involves a minimal intrusion on privacy interests,
... the Fourth Amendment protections are correspondingly less stringent.... [When
the State seeks to intrude upon an interest in which our society recognizes a
significantly heightened privacy interest, a more substantial justification is required to
make the search 'reasonable'."); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(holding that ordinary search incident to arrest theory could not justify involuntarily
taking blood from a motorist who had been arrested for DUI). Although it character-
ized the search in question as "a minor bodily intrusion" the Schmerber court stated
that the "interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects"
require a "clear indication" that such an intrusion will turn up incriminating evidence
before it may be undertaken. Id at 769-70. The Court said the intrusion at issue was
one which "involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain," but found it significant that it
was performed "by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted
medical practices." Id at 771.
296. The Court has found it difficult to formulate a definition of seizure. See
Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth
Amendment "Seizures"? 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729. In 1990, a majority of the Court
said that a seizure occurs "when there is governmental termination of freedom of
movement through means intentionally applied." Michigan Dep't. of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593
(1989)). The next year, a seven person majority indicated that a necessary, though not
sufficient, condition for a seizure is whether, in view of all the circumstances, "a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." California v.
Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). Two months later, six of those seven members of the Court
said that when a person's freedom of movement is restricted by a factor independent
of police conduct, a seizure has occurred if taking into account all the circumstances,
"the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not
at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business."' Florida v. Bostick,
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it occurs in a public place.2 7 "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places,"'298 and a person is "[u]nquestionably ... entitled to the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment as he walk[s] down the street."'2
When people are in their homes they have, in addition to the right to be
free from unreasonable seizures of their persons, a right to be free from
unreasonable entries into their home." Looking at the matter from a
different perspective, arrest in a home is a two step process that invades two
separate interests: First, there is the initial intrusion into the home; and
second, there is "the actual seizure or arrest of the suspect""' In contrast,
I1I S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 569
(1988)).
297. Cf Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and "The Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REv. 1289, 1304-05 (1981); see also Alan J.
Statman, Note, Watson and Santana: Death Knell for Arrest Warrants?, 28 SYR. L.
REv. 787, 795-99 (1977).
Being in a public place does, of course, reduce one's expectations of privacy vis-
a-vis others viewing one's person. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14
(1973) ("No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the
sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a
mystery to the world."); see also People v. Whitaker, 476 N.E.2d 294, 296 (N.Y.
1985) (one has "no reasonable expectation of privacy in physical characteristics
constantly exposed to the public.").
298. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
299. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
300. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588-89 (1980) ("To be arrested in
the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of
the sanctity of the home.") (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., Goldsmith v. United States, 439 U.S. 913 (1978)). But
cf ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 72, § 120.6, Commentary at 307 ("[lit is far from
clear that an arrest in one's home is so much more threatening or humiliating than a
street arrest.").
301. See Statman, supra note 297, at 798; see also Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204 (1981) (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires that police officers who
search the house of one person in order to execute a warrant for the arrest of another
person, must obtain a warrant to search the third party's home).
In Payton, the Court held that "an arrest warrant founded on probable cause
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect
lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within." Payton, 445 U.S. at 603.
In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), the defendant, who had just sold
heroin to an informant and whom the police had probable cause to arrest for that
offense, retreated from her doorway into the vestibule of her home when she observed
the police approaching. The officers arrested her inside and the Court, in upholding
the arrest, stated that while in the doorway "[s]he was not in an area where she had
any expectation of privacy," but rather was "as exposed to public view.., as if she
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an arrest in a public place involves only a one step process and invades only
one kind of interest.
Because the Supreme Court considers intrusions into the home the
principal evil against which the Fourth Amendment is directed, a warrant is
necessary, absent exigent circumstances, before the police may enter a private
home to arrest a person for either a felony" or a misdemeanor. 3 When
exigent circumstances exist, however, the right of the police to enter a private
home without a warrant is diminished if the arrest is to be made for a minor
offense.3"t This is so because the privacy interest remains the same while
the government's interest in making the arrest decreases as the seriousness of
the offense decreases. This same balance of interests suggests that a warrant
is a more appropriate prerequisite to a public arrest for a misdemeanor than
for a public arrest for a felony. As with home entries, the privacy interest,
although of a different kind, remains constant while the government's interest
in making the arrest decreases as the seriousness of the offense decreases.
Occasional suggestions have been made that one's expectations of privacy
can be reduced or lost by taking advantage of that privacy to commit illegal
acts." 5  Generally, however, courts have rejected this argument °6 and
warrantless arrests for all misdemeanors cannot be justified on the theory that
arrestees have a reduced expectation of privacy merely because they are
suspected of having committed a crime. 7
had been standing completely outside her house." Id. at 42. Therefore, said the
majority, her arrest was analogous to that which was approved in Watson and "her act
of retreating into her house could [not] thwart an otherwise proper arrest," because
"[tihis case, involv[ed] . . . a true .... 'hot pursuit' sufficient to justify the
warrantless entry into Santana's house." Santana, 427 U. S. at 42-43. The officer's
right to arrest, "set in motion in a public place," was not lost by reason of her attempt
to "escap[e] ... to a private place." Id. at 43.
302. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
303. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
304. See, e.g., id See generally Schroeder, supra note 237, at 458-86.
305. See, e.g., United States v. Tones, 751 F.2d 875, 883 (7th Cir. 1984) ("There
is no right to be let alone while assembling bombs in safe houses."); Timothy E.
Grady, Note, Warrantless Entry to Arrest: A Practical Solution to a Fourth
Amendment Problem, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 655, 669 n.87 (observing that the argument
that "one who has narcotics in his home had abused the privacy of his home by
committing a crime ... could be expanded to apply a diminished expectation of
privacy when an individual has committed a felony").
306. See, e.g., United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585, 591 n.8 (lth Cir. 1986)
(one's privacy expectations in his home are not destroyed simply because one has
committed a serious crime there), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987); Elliotte v.
Commonwealth, 372 S.E.2d 416, 418 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (same).
307. To hold that a person's expectations of privacy are reduced because he is
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At least one court has said that a person suspected of a jailable offense
has a lesser expectation of privacy than a person suspected of a nonjailable
offense." 8 If privacy expectations decline as the penalty for a suspected
offense rises, a warrant requirement would be more appropriate for misde-
meanor arrests than for felony arrests.
c. The Seriousness of the Intrusion
The Supreme Court has said that intrusions into the home are the
principle evil against which the Fourth Amendment was directed."
Consequently, the Court has generally required agents of the government to
obtain a warrant before entering a residence. 0 The Supreme Court has said
that some other intrusions are less serious. For example, the Court has said
that seizures of property are generally less intrusive than searches because "a
seizure affects only the person's possessory interests; a search affects a
person's privacy interests."" The Court has also said that a on-arrest
seizure, such as a Terry stop,312 is "surely less intrusive" than a search.'
suspected of having engaged in illegal activities would "convictthe suspect even before
the evidence against him was gathered." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391
(1978).
308. See State v. Ellinger, 725 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Mont. 1986) (distinguishing
Welsh on the ground, among others, that a Montana resident charged with drunk
driving has a lesser expectation of privacy than a Wisconsin resident charged with the
same offense because driving under the influence is a ' jailable offense" in Montana).
309. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980); see also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
810 (1984) ("Mhe home is sacred in Fourth Amendment terms not primarily because
of the occupants' possessory interests in the premises, but because of their privacy
interests in the activities that take place within.").
310. See, e.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 (holding unconstitutional defendant's
warrantless misdemeanor arrest inside his home and stating that "searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable") (quoting Payton,
445 U.S. at 586); Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90.
311. Segura, 468 U.S. at 806, 810 (holding that it was not unreasonable, where
officers had probable cause, for them to wait in defendant's apartment for 19 hours to
prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant was being
sought and stating that "the heightened protection we accord privacy interests is simply
not implicated where a seizure of premises, not a search, is at issue.").
312. The term Terry stop generally refers to stops of short duration undertaken
on the basis of reasonable suspicion. See generally SEARCH & SEIZURE, supra, note
9 at §§ 9.1-9.3.
313. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981).
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Some cases suggest that arrests are less serious intrusions than are
searches.314 Many authorities recognize, however, that custodial arrests are
ordinarily more intrusive than searches. 15 A search may result in physical
damage to the premises and emotional distress to the occupants or owners,316
but these people are generally free, even if something incriminating is found,
to go about their business once the search is concluded. A custodial arrest,
however, will have a long-lasting impact on the arrestee.17
The impact of a warrantless arrest is lessened somewhat because a person
arrested without a legal warrant cannot be held for a significant period unless
there is a determination that there was probable cause to arrest.3 18  The
record of the arrest will already have been made, however, and no decision
that the arrestee "should go free can come quickly enough to erase the
invasion of his privacy that already will have occurred.
3 19
Although the Supreme Court considers seizures of property to be minor
intrusions, the Court has held that in the absence of exigent circumstances or
special needs, a warrant is necessary before such a seizure can be conduct-
ed. 20 Similarly, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant should be required
before an arrest can be made.
314. See, e.g., State v. Heinz, 480 A.2d 452, 460 (Conn. 1984) (noting that
"because arrests are inherently less apt to be intrusive than are searches, there is a
difference in the constitutional standards by which probable cause to arrest and
probable cause to search are measured.").
315. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("A search may cause only annoyance and temporary inconvenience to the
law-abiding citizen .... An arrest, however, is a serious personal intrusion regardless
of whether the person seized is guilty or innocent."); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 776 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) ("[The invasion and disruption of a man's life
and privacy which stem from his arrest are ordinarily far greater than the relatively
minor intrusions attending a search of his premises."); Barrett, supra note 67, at 47
("By comparison [to the consequences of an arrest,] the consequences to a law-abiding
citizen of an illegal search are minor.").
316. See Steven Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1419 n.104
(1986) ("A home search can inflict embarrassment or pain on the searchees, and
opportunities to confiscate or even steal drugs, money or other valuables are
substantial.").
317. See supra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
318. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975); see also County
of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1670 (1991) (stating that 'judicial
determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter,
comply with the promptness requirement").
319. See, e.g., Watson, 423 U.S. at 428 (Powell, J., concurring).
320. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987).
[Vol. 58
74
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss4/1
WARRANTLESS MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS
d. The Need for a Clear-Cut Rule
In Watson, the Court observed that Congress had "plainly decided against
conditioning warrantless arrest power on proof of exigent circumstances."32'
The Court opined that allowing warrantless felony arrests on probable cause
was a reasonable alternative to allowing prosecutions to be encumbered "with
endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances."3"
In the case of serious offenses, exigencies of one kind or another may be
present so frequently that it is simpler and more effective to allow arrests in
all cases to be based on probable cause alone, "especially since that issue can
be determined very shortly after the arrest."'3" When minor offenses are
concerned, however, exigencies of one kind or another are likely to be present
only infrequently. 24  Consequently, a bright line rule governing all
misdemeanor arrests would require dispensing with the warrant requirement
in the vast majority of misdemeanor cases (and losing the protections it
affords) or, alternatively, imposing a warrant requirement in cases which such
a requirement would clearly be damaging to law enforcement interests.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,325 the Court observed that "[t]he police often
are unaware when they arrest a person whether he may have committed a
misdemeanor or a felony." '326 The Berkemer Court added that often the
nature of an arrestee's offense "may depend upon circumstances unknowable
to the police, such as whether a suspect has previously committed a similar
offense or has a criminal record of some other kind... ."" or it "may turn
321. Watson, 423 U.S. at 423.
322. Id. at 423.
323. SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 5.1(b) at 400 (quoting Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 759 (1969) (White, J., dissenting)).
324. Cf Watson, 423 U.S. at 440 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the
"in the presence" exception for warrantless misdemeanor arrests "was essentially a
narrowly drawn exigent-circumstances exception") (citing Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 157 (1925)).
325. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
326. Id. at 430; cf Newberry v. State, 493 So.2d 995, 996-98 (Ala. 1986)
(holding that a statute was not unconstitutional because the range of prescribed
punishments was such that the accused could not know at the time of his arrest
whether he was charged with a felony or with a misdemeanor).
327. Burkermer, 468 U.S. at 430-3 1; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,
20 (1985) ("An officer is in no position to know ... the precise value of property
stolen, or whether the crime was a first or second offense."). See, e.g., 625 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/11-501(d)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (third or subsequent drunk driving
offense is a felony); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193(1)(C) (McKinney 1993) (second
drunk driving offense is a felony); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.07(B) (Anderson
1987) (second negligent vehicular homicide offense is a felony).
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upon events yet to happen, such as whether a [person] . . . dies.0 28
Different warrant requirements for misdemeanors and felonies could leave the
police wondering in some cases whether they need a warrant to make a
particular arrest.3 29 The result could be warrants unnecessarily sought and
arrests invalidated because needed warrants were not obtained.
Extending Watson to permit warrantless public arrests for all offenses
would eliminate the problems that arise when police officers find it difficult
to identify the offense for which an arrest will be made. In fact, some
observers have argued that these kinds of difficulties are a reason to abandon
the common law warrant requirement for most misdemeanor arrests.330
These arguments are not compelling. Because there are advantages to
obtaining an arrest warrant even if one is not necessary,331 the police, in
close cases, should simply do so. Few convictions are likely to be lost
because of the time consumed in obtaining a warrant and few arrests will be
invalidated because of the failure to do so.
When an arrest warrant is obtained prior to an arrest, advance notice of
the offense for which the arrest is to be made will ordinarily be necessary to
obtain the warrant.332 Further, an arrest generally will be valid if the police
had probable cause to believe that the person arrested committed some
crime.333 If the police choose to proceed without a warrant, the burden
328. Burkemer, 468 U.S. at 431.
329. See ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 72, § 120.1, Commentary at 290 ("mhe
distinction between felony and misdemeanor is often technical, requiring a judgment
not easily made in the field by a police officer.").
Because the vast majority of private citizens are unlikely to have any clear idea
whether a particular.act is a felony or a misdemeanor, the right of private citizens to
arrest should probably turn on the nature of the offense, for example, whether it is a
breach of the peace, or a larceny. See Kauffman, supra note 275, at 150.
330. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 4, at 182-83; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 140.10 (Consol. 1986), Commission Staff Notes (suggesting that this was a reason
for abolishing the in-the-presence requirement).
331. See Watson, 423 U. S. at 423.
332. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 105 ("The warrant must set forth facts sufficient
to constitute a violation of the law, in words adequate to apprise the accused of the
crime with which he is charged."); see also State v. McGowan, 90 S.E.2d 703, 704
(N.C. 1956) ("A valid warrant of arrest must... identify the person charged.").
333. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWs, § 12-7-5 (1981) ("If a lawful cause of arrest
exists, the arrest shall be lawful even though the officer made the arrest on improper
ground."); Hatcher v. State, 410 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (Ind. 1980) (search incident to
arrest valid where police officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for armed
robbery but instead arrested him for disorderly conduct-for which she had no
probable cause); see also People v. Corrigan, 473 N.E.2d 140, 142-44 (ill. App. Ct.
1985) (search incident to arrest valid where police had probable cause to arrest
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should be on the government, given the Supreme Court's stated preference for
warrants, to show that a warrantless arrest was justified because the police had
probable cause to believe that the suspect had committed a felony.
e. History and Current Practices
In holding that a warrantless public felony arrest on probable cause was
constitutionally permissible, the Watson Court emphasized that the common
law rule authorizing such arrests had "survived substantially intact ... in
almost all of the States," was recommended by the American Law Institute,
and "is the rule Congress has long directed its principal law enforcement
officers to follow." ' 4  In a similar vein, the common law in-the-presence
requirement, although often modified, has survived in some form "in almost
defendant for DUI and various ordinance violations but instead arrested him for riding
his bicycle in the roadway-for which they had no probable cause); see also United
States ex rel. Frasier v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1972) (arrest upheld
where police had probable cause to believe that a serious crime had been committed,
but could not "determine precisely what that crime was"); State v. Copeland, 727 P.2d
1342, 1346 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (same); ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 72,
§ 120.1(2) ("An arrest shall not be deemed to have been made on insufficient cause
hereunder solely on the ground that the officer is unable to determine the particular
crime which may have been committed."); cf People v. Mitchell, 360 N.W.2d 158,
161 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (where probable cause exists to believe a suspect is guilty
of one of several alternative felonies an arrest may be made for any one).
A few courts have suggested that the crime for which an "arrest is made and a
crime for which probable cause exists [should be] ... in some fashion related." See
United States v. Atkinson, 450 F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Mills v.
Wainwright, 415 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1969)); see also Wainwright v. City of New
Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 606 & n.6 (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); cf ALA. CODE
§ 15-10-4 (1982) (requiring statement at time of warrantless arrest of the officer's
"authority and the cause of arrest"); United States v. Davis, 328 U.S. 582, 610-11 n.4
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting with approval from an English Court of
Appeal decision, Leachinsky v. Christie, 1 K.B. 124, 135 (1946), which held that
"[tlhe legality of arrest turns on the justification which the arresting officer gives atthe
time of arrest."); Walker v. City of Mobile, 508 So. 2d 1209, 1214 (Ala. Crim. App.
1987), cert. denied, 508 So. 2d 1209 (Ala. 1987) (restating ALA. CODE § 15-10-4,
cited supra). But cf United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 592 (1948) (declining to
decide whether "an arrest without a warrant on a charge not communicated at the time
may later be justified if the arresting officer's knowledge gave probable cause to
believe any felony found in the statute books had been committed.").
In England the law appears to be "that if a man is arrested on one charge he is
entitled to his release the moment the prosecution of that charge is abandoned." Davis,
328 U.S. at 610 n.4 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Leachinsky, 1 K.B. at 135).
334. Watson, 423 U.S. at 421-23.
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all of the States." '335 Only a small minority of states permit warrantless
misdemeanor arrests on the same terms as felony arrests.336 Moreover, the
in-the-presence requirement was recommended, with modifications for exigent
circumstances, by the American Law Institute.337
History and current practices both suggest that absent exigent circum-
stances warrantless arrests should not be permitted for misdemeanors
committed outside the arresting officer's presence. Current practices,
however, do not suggest that the breach of the peace requirement should be
deemed constitutionally required. That requirement, although firmly rooted
in the common law, has been abandoned in almost every American jurisdic-
tion.33 S
f Absence of Facts for a Magistrate to Evaluate
The Supreme Court has consistently held that "no warrant is necessary
when there is little or nothing for the magistrate to decide." 9 Misdemeanor
arrests, however, are clearly not an area in which the magistrate has "little or
nothing" to decide. Whether there is sufficient evidence to justify an arrest
is a traditional area of inquiry for magistrates and judges.
g. Overloading the Warrant Process
Professor LaFave suggests that the Supreme Court's willingness to carve
out exceptions to the warrant requirement is influenced by a desire "not to
overburden the warrant-issuing process."34 As an abstract proposition, it is
probably true that "a greatly expanded warrant system" might turn the warrant
procedure into even more of a "mechanical routine" than it already is.34" '
Many jurisdictions, however, require an officer to obtain a warrant as a
precondition to most misdemeanor arrests. There is no evidence that the
335. Watson, 423 U.S. at 423. See supra notes 10-16.
336. See supra note 18.
337. ALI MODEL CODE, supra note 72, § 120.1; see also supra notes 231-33 and
accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
339. SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 4.1(a) at 121. See, e.g., Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) ("l]n light of the
standardized nature of the tests [at issue] and the minimal discretion vested in those
charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral
magistrate to evaluate.").
340. SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, § 4.1(a) at 119.
341. See id. § 4.1(a) at 120; see also Wayne R. LaFave, Further Ventures into the
"Quagmire", 8 CRiM. L. BULL. 9, 28 (1972).
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judiciary has been overburdened in those jurisdictions,342 or that the warrant
system there has been turned into more of a mechanical routine than it already
is.343
h. Gerstein-McLaughlin Hearings as a Substitute
for a Warrant Requirement
Even in felony cases, the Supreme Court has recognized the value of an
independent determination of probable cause. In Gerstein v. Pugh,3' the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires that a person arrested without
a warrant be given a prompt, fair, and reliable judicial "determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following
arrest."345 The Court observed that prolonged detention following arrest
may imperil a "suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his
family relationships."3" It noted, however, that once a suspect is in custody,
the reasons that justified proceeding without a warrant evaporate and "[t]here
is no longer any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes
while the police submit their evidence to a magistrate. 347
In the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on warrantless
arrests, County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,348 Justice O'Connor's opinion
for the majority noted that Gerstein acknowledged that "prolonged detention"
based on unfounded suspicion may unjustly "imperil [a] suspect's job,
interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships." 349 Her
opinion observed that the Gerstein Court balanced these consequences against
342. Cf Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980) (noting that the parties
had argued "about the practical consequences of a warrant requirement as a
precondition to a felony arrest in the home" and concluding that "[i]n the absence of
any evidence that effective law enforcement has suffered in those States that already
have such a requirement ... we are inclined to view such arguments with skepti-
cism.").
343. See infra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.
344. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
345. Id at 114.
346. Id
347. Id The Court found historical support for its decision "in the common law
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 114; cf State v.
Freeman, 86 N.C. 683, 685-86 (1882) (when a police officer apprehends an offender
he must "carry him at once before ajustice or other tribunal having jurisdiction"). But
cf Douglass v. Barber, 28 A. 805, 806 (R.I. 1894) (officer who makes warrantless
arrest for a minor offense committed in his presence need not subsequently procure a
warrant to validate it).
348. 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991)
349. Id. at 1668 (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114).
1993]
79
Schroeder: chroeder: Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the state's interest in "taking into custody those persons who are reasonably
suspected of having engaged in criminal activity,"35 and concluded that "the
competing interests articulated in Gerstein" justify a rule that "judicial
determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general
matter, comply with... Gerstein.0
51
Prompt Gerstein hearings are not an adequate substitute for a warrant in
misdemeanor cases. In Watson, Justice Marshall observed that Gerstein
provides the "best protection possible against less-than-probable-cause
warrantless arrests based on exigent circumstances. 352  Under ordinary
circumstances, however, Gerstein does not provide the best possible protection
against "less-than-probable-cause warrantless arrests." As the Court recog-
nized in Gerstein, the best protection against unjustified arrest is "a
magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to any arrest. 33
Gerstein and McLaughlin held that the balance of interests that is at the
heart of the Fourth Amendment requires the equivalent of a warrant soon after
arrest when the offense is serious and the need for quick police action is great.
That same balance of interests demands a warrant before the arrest when the
offense is minor and there are no exigent circumstances that suggest a need
for immediate action. The danger that persons suspected of serious crimes
"will escape or commit further crimes while the police submit their evidence
to a magistrate,"3  may justify the possibility of wrongful arrest and
detention inherent in the warrantless arrest of such offenders. That possibility
cannot be justified, however, when the offense is minor and there is no
significant danger "that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while
the police submit their evidence to a magistrate."
355
The burden imposed by a warrant requirement for most misdemeanor
arrests is minimal, while the right protected is weighty. The value of a
warrant requirement is reduced somewhat because many judges and "magis-
trates perform only a cursory review of ... warrant application[s], 356 while
350. Id. at 1668.
351. Id. at 1670. Gerstein and McLaughlin apply to warrantless misdemeanor
arrests. See White v. Taylor, 954 F.2d 539,, 546 (5th Cir. 1992).
352. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,448 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
353. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113.
354. Id. at 114.
355. Id See also supra notes 267-75 and accompanying text.
356. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn, supra note 102, at 135. Many observers
have commented on the "'rubber stamp' quality of magistrate review of warrant
applications." See, e.g., Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 177, at 34 (citing
authorities). The Supreme Court, however, has said it is "not convinced this is a
problem of major proportions." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 n.14 (1984).
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others lack the legal training necessary to screen warrant applications
effectively.37 Nonetheless, a warrant can provide some protection against
unjustified misdemeanor arrests,358 and, unless there are exigent circumstanc-
es, a warrant should be required if an arrest is sought to be made for a
misdemeanor committed outside the officer's presence.
D. The Requirement of an Immediate Arrest
Most statements of the common law rule omit the requirement that a
warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor must be made at the time of the offense
or as soon thereafter as possible. In 1967, however, one author observed that
even in those states that have abolished the breach of the peace requirement,
"the rule persists that such arrest must be made immediately or 'upon fresh
pursuit' of the offender."" 9 That author argued that this requirement is
"illogical.""36
In fact, the requirement of an immediate arrest serves two important
purposes. First, at common law the failure to take prompt action was
conclusive evidence that there was no necessity to take the offender into
custody.36' This premise remains true; there is rarely a need to take the
offender into custody in cases involving minor offenses. 62 Second, the kind
357. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 346 (1977) (rejecting the
argument that magistrates must be lawyers and holding that court clerks who are not
lawyers may issue warrants).
358. See supra notes 198, 200-06 and accompanying text.
359. FISHER, supra note 4, at 182; see also id §§ 86 & 87, at 187-91. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15(1) (West Supp. 1993) ("An arrest for the commission of
a misdemeanor or the violation of a munincipal ordinance shall be made immediately
or in fresh pursuit."); VT. R. Cimiv. P. 3(a) (Supp. 1993) ("arrest shall be made while
the crime is being committed or without unreasonable delay thereafter"); see also
Commonwealth v. Conway, 316 N.E.2d 757, 759 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974). But see
Main v. McCarty, 15 I11. 441, 443 (1854) (an arrest for an offense involving a breach
of the peace need not be made immediately).
360. FISHER, supra note 4, at 182.
361. Id. at 189. The "reason for arrest for misdemeanors without warrant at
common law was promptly to suppress breaches of the peace." Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925).
362. State v. Hurtado, 529 A.2d 1000, 1008 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987),
(Skillman, J., dissenting), rev'd on dissent, 549 A.2d 428 (N.J. 1988) (even given the
"public interest in securing the presence at trial of any alleged offender .. . some
offenses do not pose a sufficiently grave threat to the public welfare to warrant even
the temporary detention of an alleged offender .... Furthermore, since there
inevitably will be some persons who will be unable to post bail, there are also public
interests in not incarcerating persons accused of minor regulatory offenses solely on
1993]
81
Schroeder: Schroeder: Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
of conduct that many misdemeanors criminalize is so insignificant that the
actor may not realize she has engaged in the prohibited conduct and she may
not recall having done so even if she realized it at the time.363 A delayed
arrest may impair the arrestee's ability to defend herself.3"4
If arrest is not possible at the time of the offense or immediately
thereafter there should ordinarily be sufficient time to obtain a warrant.3 65
Therefore, a warrant requirement in those cases is not likely to impose any
significant costs on law enforcement interests. 3' The balancing of
competing interests suggests that warrantless misdemeanor arrests are
constitutionally unreasonable unless made immediately.3 67 In addition, there
has been "little trend toward relaxing the requirement of immediate ar-
rest. 3 68  The common law rule, the balance of interests, and current
practices all strongly suggest that immediate arrest is required by the
Constitution's command that all searches and seizures be reasonable.369
account of their indigency and in not exacerbating existing problems of prison
overcrowding.").
It has been observed that at common law "there were no swift means ... to
escape the law, and... no compelling reason" to do so. FISHER, supra note 4, at 189.
Today, there are still "no compelling reason[s]" for a misdemeanor suspect to flee. See
supra notes 271-75 and accompanying text.
Some jurisdictions bar custodial arrests for some minor offenses, see supra note
90, or permit them only under limited circumstances, see supra note 91. It has been
suggested that the Constitution bars custodial arrests for some minor offenses, see
supra note 92.
363. Most drivers wopld have great difficulty, for example, remembering the
speed at which they were traveling at a given point a few hours earlier.
364. But cf People v. Lawson, 367 N.E.2d 1244, 1248 (Ill. 1977) (rejecting
defendant's arguments that delayed arrests caused them to be unable to remember and
assist in their defense and noting that there is no constitutional right to be arrested once
a violation has occurred (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966)).
365. Some courts have held that the failure to obtain a warrant where there was
sufficient time and opportunity to do so invalidates a misdemeanor arrest. See, e.g.,
Yancey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 100 S.E.2d 653, 655-56 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1957).
366. See supra notes 262-87 and accompanying text.
367. Cf County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 1670 (1991)
("Taking into account the competing interests articulated in Gerstein, we believe that
... judicial 'determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest" are
constitutionally reasonable).
368. FISHER, supra note 4, at 188.
369. Cf McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. at 1672 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Constitution "preserves for our citizens the traditional protections against unlawful








At common law, no person could be arrested for a misdemeanor unless
the offense involved a breach of the peace and was committed in the presence
of the person making the arrest. In addition, the common law required that
the arrest be made as soon as possible. Over the years this rule has slowly
been eroded and arrest powers have been expanded in response to the demands
of laws enforcement officials and interest groups. This erosion should be
stopped and some version of the common law rule should be
constitutionalized.
The state's interest in prosecuting people suspected of misdemeanors is,
because they are misdemeanors, minor. The consequences of a custodial
arrest are profound and long-lasting. Over a half century ago, two authors
observed that "[t]he passion of modem legislatures for the regulation of the
most intimate concerns of every-day life is notorious" and opined that it was
unfair and unnecessary to subject individuals, particularly travelers, to the risk
of being arrested on sight because their conduct contravened some local
regulation.37 These views remain valid today.
Because almost every state has discarded the breach of the peace
requirement, current practices suggest that aspect of the common law rule
should not be consitutionalized. The in-the-presence rule, however, is another
matter. Most states impose the in-the-presence requirement in at least some
cases. The justifications that the Supreme Court has given for dispensing with
the warrant requirement suggest that absent exigent circumstances, the
Constitution requires a warrant when an arrest is made for a misdemeanor
committed outside the arresting officer's presence. The balancing of
competing interests, "the key principle of the Fourth Amendment,""37 also
suggests that absent exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests for misdemean-
ors committed outside the arresting officer's presence are constitutionally
unreasonable. Finally, the common law, to which the Supreme Court has
consistently looked to determine the extent of the Fourth Amendment's
protections, suggests that some version of the in-the-presence rule is
constitutionally required.
The courts should rule that absent exigent circumstances,37 warrantless
arrests for misdemeanors committed outside the arresting officer's presence are
unreasonable and violate the Fourth Amendment. In addition, the courts
should rule that the Constitution demands that warrantless misdemeanor arrests
be made at the time of the offense or as soon thereafter as possible.
370. See Bohlen & Shulman, supra note 8, at 491-92.
371. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,700 n.12 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U. S. 200, 219 (1979) (White, J., concurring).
372. Future litigation can determine the precise meaning ofexigent circumstances.
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